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Abstract 
Taking a point of departure in a reflection on the future of fragile states, this project 
aims at proposing a theoretical framework for how to most effectively generate 
development in fragile states. The international development strategy of the 
Millennium Development Goals and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States 
will be used as empirical data due to representing, respectively, a one-fits-all strategy 
to development and a ‘new deal’ on how to engage in fragile states before being able 
to engage in the one-fits-all strategy. Our analysis will highlight how the strategies 
correspond to our theoretical framework and by that account, what consequences it 
poses for the strategies’ compatibility. We will further discuss different parameters of 
compatibility that are essential to keep in mind when considering the two strategies 
and their relation to the future of fragile states. Ultimately, we will conclude that the 
two strategies are compatible to a certain degree, but face different challenges 
concerning goals, processes and actors.  
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Reader’s guide  
In the problem area we will present the contextual circumstances leading up to our 
problem formulation. The problem formulation will describe our particular interests 
within the circumstances described through a problem area. Additional working 
questions will operationalize our problem formulation and thus shape the project. 
 
In the methodology chapter we will explain the methodological considerations that 
have laid ground for the production of this project. We will systematically explain 
considerations relating to our empirical data, choice of theory, the key concept used, 
and strategy of analysis, which has ultimately led to the delimited perspective of our 
project. 
 
In chapter three, our theoretical framework for development in fragile state will be 
explained. The theoretical framework will be divided into an elaboration of national 
and international contexts of development with focus on three development actors: the 
state, civil society, and the international community. This framework will be based on 
contemporary understandings of development thus being a response to our first 
working question. 
 
In the analysis chapter we will analyse our empirical data, the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States 
(New Deal) development strategies, according to our theoretical framework 
constructed in the previous chapter to answer our second working question. In the 
analysis we will look at how the two strategies perceive the three development actors 
presented as essential in the theory chapter, to better understand how they can lead to 
development in fragile states in accordance with our theoretical framework. 
 
The analytical findings will then be used to facilitate a discussion on the compatibility 
of the MDG and New Deal strategy in extension of each other: answering our third 
and last working question. To put the analytical results and discussion into a broader 
perspective, we will further discuss the strategies’ roles in the larger debate on fragile 
states and development. 
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The discussion will then lead to a conclusion, answering our problem formulation, 
and give way for a segment containing further considerations that have had influence 
on the results and contents of our project but are not main focal points. 
 
Figure 1: Reader’s guide 
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Abbreviations  
The Dialogue  The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
EPI   Environmental Performance Index 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FOCUS Fragility assessment, One vision, one plan, Compact, Use PSGs 
to monitor, Support political dialogue 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GNI   Gross National Index 
GNP    Gross National Product 
HIPC   Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
HPI   Happy Planet Index 
IMF   International Monetary Fond 
MDGs   Millennium Development Goals 
New Deal  New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States 
NGO    Non-Governmental Organisation 
ODA    Official Development Aid 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PITF   The Political Instability Task Force 
PSG    Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals 
SIDS   Small Island Developing States 
TRUST Transparency of aid, Risk sharing, Use and strengthen country 
systems, Strengthen capacity, Timely and predictable aid 
UN    United Nations
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1. Problem area 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), initiated in 2000, encompassing a 
global strategy for alleviating poverty has failed to show satisfactory results according 
to its development means and goals in fragile states. This has resulted in the 
establishment of a newly formed group of fragile states that has formed an alternative 
development strategy, as a response to the failures of the MDGs. Can these two 
strategies work together and contribute to a better future for fragile states? 
 
From 6-8 September 2000, the ‘Millennium Summit’ took place in New York City, 
USA. The summit was initiated by the United Nations General Assembly in order to 
discuss the future role and prominence of the United Nations in development in the 
new millennium. The Millennium Summit brought together leaders of UN member 
states to discuss how to most effectively combat global poverty. At the time, it was 
the largest gathering of world leaders to ever occur (UN Millennium Project 2005: 2). 
The outcome of the meeting was the adoption of the Millennium Declaration. 
Developed on the foundation of the consensus formed in the Millennium Declaration, 
the Millennium Development Goals were articulated in the UN General Assembly’s 
Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration 
the year after, as eight articulated development goals to be achieved by the year 2015 
(Brinkerhoff, Smith & Teegen 2007: 1). The eight MDGs are: 
 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women 
4. Reduce child mortality 
5. Improve maternal health 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 
8. Develop a global partnership for development. (UN Secretary-General 2001: 56-58) 
 
The first seven goals are heavily influenced by the development objectives listed by 
the ‘Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’ (OECD) in their 
1996 report Shaping the 21st Century with the addition of an eighth goal inserting 
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developed countries’ obligations to help achieve the development goals (Browne in 
Mavrotas 2010: 155). The adoption and subsequent ratification of the MDGs by all 
UN member states was thus a reaffirmation of the UN’s, and 189 member states’, 
commitment to alleviating worldwide poverty. It further reaffirmed the UN as a 
legitimate global development actor to work in close cooperation with states and their 
respective civil societies (UN General Assembly 1 2000: 8-9).  
 
The MDG strategy
1
 has a focus, though compositionally to a debated degree, on 
economic, social and environmental development. However, although the MDG 
strategy seemingly encompasses both economic and social strategies of development, 
and suggests universal application, a large number of countries are yet to achieve a 
single MDG: the number of which levelling up to a third of all developing countries 
as of 2010 (Browne in Mavrotas 2010: 155). In spite of more than 30% of all Official 
Development Aid (ODA) being directed and aimed at states characterized by state 
and peace fragility, these countries and their 1.5 billion citizens are yet to achieve 
satisfactory results in accordance with the goals articulated by the MDG initiative 
(g7+ 1 2011: 1). One fundamental critique of the MDG strategy has been on the 
different social, political and economic stages the participating UN member states are 
on as a starting point and subsequently how the different countries as a result have 
different roles in the development process. For some states, commitment to the MDG 
strategy has meant working towards nationally achieving the MDGs, while for others, 
committing to the MDGs has meant promoting development in other countries 
through the contribution of aid. Due to the unequal success of achieving development 
through the MDG strategy across the globe, different groupings of international actors 
have come together (Kaplan 2008: 68). One of these groups, criticizing the MDG 
strategy for still not being able to adequately create development globally, is called 
the g7+. 
 
The g7+
2
 is a group of states self-defined as being characterized by peace and state 
instability or fragility. The tool of measurement for the g7+ is a fragility spectrum that 
                                                        
1 Used to refer to the accumulated strategies and goals described in the Millennium Declaration and 
Road Map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration. 
2 Consisting of, at the time of writing: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, 
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allows the so-called fragile states to determine their position within a ten-level scale 
of fragility. This self-proclamation of fragility is then to be acknowledged by the 
international community ultimately resulting in interventions and aid being directed 
according to the spectrum. The categorization of being a fragile state within the g7+ 
thus does not cover a clean-cut homogeneous group of states but rather states 
experiencing different degrees of fragility. 
 
Through the body of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
(The Dialogue), consisting of the g7+ group along with international partners 
including the UN, a new strategy for ensuring development for the most MDG result-
challenged states was proposed: the New Deal strategy
3
. The New Deal consists of 
five goals, the so-called Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) as well as 
FOCUS and TRUST, which elaborates on conditions of implementation, monitoring, 
and efficiency of the PSGs. The three aspects of the New Deal are: 
 
PSGs   FOCUS   TRUST 
 
Inclusive politics Fragility assessment  Transparency of aid 
Security  One vision, one plan  Risk sharing 
Justice   Compact   Use and strengthen country systems 
Economic foundation Use PSGs to monitor  Strengthen capacity 
Revenue and services Support political dialogue Timely and predictable aid 
(Da Costa 2012: 100) 
 
The imperative of the New Deal strategy is not to discard of the MDG development 
strategy but is proposed to be prerequisite for achieving the MDGs; the New Deal 
strategy supposedly addresses local and regional contexts not satisfactorily considered 
in the MDG strategy. However, in spite of the New Deal being suggested to possibly 
go ahead of the MDG strategy, the New Deal strategy arguably presents a different 
focus on not only the goals but also the actors in development than the MDG strategy. 
This potentially conflicting notion of development goals and actors leads us to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, The Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste 
and Togo. 
3
 Used to refer to the accumulated strategies and goals described in New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States and the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators – Progress, Interim List and next 
steps. 
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investigate the theoretical compatibility between the two strategies that are proposed 
to go in extension of each other. 
 
The motivation for this project thus takes a point of departure in the MDG 
development strategy. Given the failure of reaching and prospects of reaching the 
MDGs, we have decided to look at the New Deal strategy. Our interest in choosing 
these two strategies is to create an understanding of how development for the most 
result-challenged states of the MDG strategy is to most successfully be met by the 
international society of the UN and the global South through the g7+. By looking at 
these different perspectives, we shall attempt to get a better understanding of the 
possible compatibility of the MDG and New Deal strategies as well as the 
contemporary debate and future prospects of fragile states in development. According 
to these circumstances the problem formulation of our project is: 
 
1.1 Problem formulation 
To what extent are the ‘Millennium Development Goal’ and ‘New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States’ development strategies compatible in approaching 
the challenges of development in fragile states? 
 
1.1.1 Working questions  
1. With the aim of development in fragile states, how can we propose a theoretical 
framework? 
 
2. How do the MDG strategy and New Deal strategy take into account the role of the 
state, civil society, and the international community in facilitating development?  
 
3. How are the two strategies compatible according to the parameters: goals, the process 
of reaching the goals and the actors responsible for achieving the goals? 
 
 
5 
 
2. Methodology 
We will in the following chapter elaborate on our methodological reflections in the 
project. We will present our considerations on choice of empirical data, choice of 
theory, key concept and elaborate on our strategy of analysis and discussion.  
2.1 Reflection on our empirical foundation 
Our empirical foundation consists of the following four documents: 
- United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000) 
- Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration (2001) 
- A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011) 
- Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators – Progress, Interim List and next 
steps (2013) 
 
The United Nations Millennium Declaration was presented as an officially adopted 
resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on the 55
th
 session in September 
2000 (UN General Assembly 2 2000). The declaration expressed a commitment 
towards new global goals of development in the new millennium.   
 
To follow up on the declaration the Road map towards the implementation of the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration was formed by the Secretary-General and 
derived from the intentions of the declaration. The roadmap included the eight 
Millennium Development Goals and was accepted in a resolution on the 56
th
 session 
by the General Assembly in January 2002. (UN General Assembly 3 2002) 
 
A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is a document presented by the 
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the g7+, development 
partners and international organisations. The New Deal from 2011 builds on the 
principles of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the Dili Declaration: a new 
vision for peacebuilding and statebuilding and the Monrovia Roadmap on 
peacebuilding and statebuilding. (g7+ 1 2011, 4) The New Deal presents a list of 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals that are aimed at fragile states. 
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To follow up on the New Deal a document called Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
Indicators – Progress, Interim List and next steps was presented and accepted at the 
Third International Dialogue Global Meeting in April 2013 by The International 
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. (The Dialogue 2 2013) The document 
is an elaboration of the New Deal, presenting newly developed indicators for the 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals as well as reflections on the next steps in the 
progress of achieving development in fragile states within the framework of New 
Deal. As the document is from April 2013 we cannot guarantee that a newer agreed 
on document with new deal indicators will not be formed. Hence, we believe this to 
be the most fitting document to compare with the Road map towards the 
implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration.  
 
In working with the four above-mentioned documents, there are several things we 
need to be aware of. We will thus reflect on how to approach the documents 
methodologically, how the documents can be seen as comparable, and how they are 
different as well as how we use them in working with our analysis.  
 
Sociologist J. Scott (Bryman 2012) provides a methodological tool in working with 
documents as primary empirical data. He thus provides as differentiation between 
types of documents as well as four criteria for assessing the quality of such 
documents, both reflections that we will apply to our empirical data. We are working 
with four documents, in J. Scott’s terms called official documents derived from 
private sources, from two international organizations. (Bryman 2012: 550) Working 
with this type of documents, we have relied on what has been in the public domain 
and thus official documents available on the Internet from official websites and 
document databases. Examining such official documents derived from private 
sources, it is important to assess the quality. In the following we will use four criteria 
to determine the quality of this project’s empirical foundation, they are: Authenticity, 
Credibility, Representativeness and Meaning. (Bryman 2012: 544)  
 
Relating authenticity to our documents we need to see if the evidence is genuine. We 
have in the presentation of the documents above taken into account the origin of the 
documents and through that wished to verify the validity of the documents. 
Concerning credibility we have to examine if the documents are free from error and 
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distortion. We have not directly examined this criterion, but still preserve our 
reservations of the quality of the documents due to the credibility obtained through 
other official documents, such as UN General Assembly Resolutions and     
                     , proving the acknowledgement and approval of the four 
documents internationally. When operating with representativeness, we need to be 
aware if the evidence is typical or untypical of its kind. Since all documents are 
representing a common voice of international organizations, we are aware, of the fact 
that divergent interpretations can appear inside the represented groups. The 
documents are official documents and do not reflect the negotiations and details of 
meetings behind such information. Additionally, we cannot say whether or not other 
documents exist and are available, which could have been better fitting for our 
project. However, we still argue that we perceive these four documents to be central 
to our project and analysis as being the primary official documents for each strategy. 
Lastly, in considering the meaning of the documents, we need to assess if they are 
clear and comprehensible. Being official documents from official organizations, we 
see the documents as being clear and comprehensible, but take into consideration that 
the language is clearly affected by being official and aimed for public use.  
 
We use the word compatible in our problem formulation and we thus wish to analyse 
how the two development strategies are compatible in relation to development in 
fragile states. To be able to assess the compatibility of the strategies, we will conduct 
our analysis through a comparative study of our empirical sources that, in our project, 
represent two development strategies. Working with the four documents as our 
primary empirical data, we thus need to take into account the methodological 
similarities and differences between the documents. Concerning similarity, all four 
documents are from official international organizations, presenting an idea of and a 
strategy to development. Differently, the two UN documents are based on a global 
development strategy represented by the United Nations, whereas the two New Deal 
documents function as a context-specific development strategy represented by a 
smaller organization, the g7+. It is as well important to take into account that we on 
purpose chose the initial document from both strategies, though being produced 11 
years later than the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States has had the possibility of applying knowledge and 
experience derived from the time the MDG framework has been in process. However, 
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we have chosen these four documents, since we find it relevant to see the initial 
statements and thus being able to compare their point of departure concerning 
strategies of development.  
 
Further, we have approached our documents hermeneutically, by “bring[ing] out the 
meanings of a text from the perspective of its author” (Bryman 2012: 560). Inspired 
by this methodological approach we have worked with our documents in two levels. 
Firstly, a fragmental level exploring the constituent parts of the document. We have 
done this by examining our empirical data, the four documents, with our theoretical 
framework in mind. We have thus ‘coded’ the data within the three categories of our 
theory, which we will present in the next chapter. We will then examine this level in 
our analysis, which will be elaborated upon in our strategy of analysis. Secondly, an 
interpretation level which makes us draw out central points from the analysis that will 
allow us to assess various degrees of compatibility, thus being able to establish a more 
comprehensive set of results. This part will constitute our discussion of the findings in 
our analysis.  
 
All of the above mentioned reflections in relations to the use of our empirical 
foundation will be evident throughout the project.  
2.2 Choice of theory  
We are in this project working from the notion of how fragile states are the most 
challenged states in achieving development through the MDG strategy and, thus, how 
a New Deal is proposed to support the way towards this goal. We have chosen to use 
theories focused on development in fragile states, to build a framework, by which we 
can argue how the two strategies are compatible in promoting development in fragile 
states. We take a point of departure in the following two books: Fixing Failed States: 
A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (2008) by Ashraf Ghani and Clare 
Lockhart and Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development (2008) by 
Seth D. Kaplan.  
 
Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart provide in their book a practical framework for a 
statebuilding strategy as a necessary solution to the current developmental and global 
problems, such as insecurity, poverty and lack of growth. The authors emphasize how 
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an effective state is a necessary condition for eradicating poverty. It is broadly 
influenced by the notion that a sovereign state, meaning a state that performs and 
provides functions that makes them sovereign, can best create and enhance human 
progress. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 4) The statebuilding strategy proposed is based on 
ten core functions of the state. The process of statebuilding is influenced by the 
interconnection of state, citizens and international community and thus presents two 
underlying processes: one compact between state and citizens focused on rights and 
another compact between state and international community focused on norms, 
accountability and transparency. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 8) 
 
The book by Seth D. Kaplan provides a redesign of political, economic and legal 
structures. Kaplan offers a critique and guiding principles for changing current 
approaches to development and the existing aid paradigm. The approach emphasizes 
local sociocultural and socioeconomic environments, strong formal and informal 
institutions, social cohesion, and support by the international community towards a 
self-sustaining, internally driven process. The book highlights the interconnection 
between state and its surrounding society, to obtain legitimacy, competency and 
encourage investments. (Kaplan 2008: 9) 
 
We argue that each book individually provides important, interesting and new aspects 
to the developmental scene of fragile states. We as well argue how the books each 
provide a different angle or emphasis in the planning of such development, which is 
why we have chosen to focus on both books in collaboration. How we will combine 
the two books into shaping our own theoretical framework will be elaborated later in 
this chapter.  
2.2.1 Critique of the two books 
In creating our theoretical framework on basis of the books of Kaplan and Ghani & 
Lockhart, it is important to keep in mind the spatial and temporal contexts of the 
authors behind those books. Though it is difficult or impossible to define absolute 
schools or ideological tendencies behind the books that are employed by the authors, 
it is possible to identify aspects of such through a closer examination of the contents 
of the two books. 
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The authors of both books argue that they stray from conventional development 
strategies in their approach to developing fragile states (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 7) 
(Kaplan 2008: xii); these conventional strategies are even cited as being causative or 
enhancing of fragility (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 5). However, although the theorists 
arguably stray from large-scale international development policies, such as those 
expressed through the organs of the likes of the UN and the World Bank, in focusing 
quite exclusively on statebuilding, it can be suggested that the authors still conform to 
many conventional approaches in spite of their attempt to remove themselves from 
that context. In spite of suggesting other socio-political, historical, and geographical 
initiatives to be important in initiating development processes, Kaplan also argues that 
eventually, “[…] nobody can deny the importance of competitive elections, free 
market reforms, and social development spending” (Kaplan 2008: xii). 
 
These aspects of development are arguably in rather close alignment with mainstream 
international development strategies. On basis of this alignment, it could be suggested 
that even though the authors and our theoretical framework seek to establish national 
development and statebuilding in fragile states the eventual goal, after building up 
state structures, is participation in the international community (Ghani & Lockhart 
2008: 3). The informal admission requirements, to the international community in 
economic, social, and political terms are the capacities to engage on the conditions 
present within that supranational arena. Within this arena tendencies of neo-liberalism 
is for example present as more or less the only platform for economic growth with an 
emphasis on competitive market conditions (Freeman in Burnell, Randall & Rakner 
2011: 337) (Allen & Thomas 2000: 9). Furthermore, democratic tendencies are 
weighed heavily with emphasis on e.g. inclusive policies and democratic state 
institutions among other things. This suggests that even if Kaplan and Ghani & 
Lockhart all argue to employ unconventional strategies, there may be a limit to how 
unconventional development approaches can divert from the international 
community’s standards if the end goal is the capacity to enter that exact community; 
this is in spite of anthropologically having lived and experienced different national 
contexts and writing from the perspective of such. That being said, in the same way, 
our own interpretations of both books are coloured by our own enmeshment in both 
our national and internationally lived experiences thus also affecting ways in which 
we have consequently conceptualized our theoretical framework. With these 
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reflections, we acknowledge that our understanding of the books’ original theories, 
and ultimately our theoretical framework, is never fully objective and is by that 
account further open to interpretation by those reading it from a different context of 
understanding. 
2.2.2 How we combine the theories  
We have chosen to combine the proposed frameworks and analytical tools from each 
book, to present a stronger framework for development in fragile states. We have 
across the themes and content of the two books identified three main actors of 
development, in which each book puts emphasis on respectively. In combining the 
two books, we have pointed out the importance of the state, civil society and the 
international community as development actors, each responsible for tasks in the path 
towards development in fragile states. However, the books highlights the three actors 
differently, why we argue that in combination, the framework we propose will be 
stronger, by including perspectives from the two books that support each other. 
Kaplan looks much beyond leaders and administrators and emphasizes the focus on 
civil society, the people and informal institutions in cooperation with the state. Ghani 
and Lockhart propose a framework heavily influenced by the emphasis on state and 
leaders and strong official institutions to perform developmental tasks. Though 
highlighting main actors differently, both books are concerned with building trust 
between state and citizens, as well as promoting an integrated process between state, 
civil society and international community. Both books argue legitimacy, 
accountability and security as main objectives in the process of development in fragile 
states.  
 
Both of the books contextualize what we ultimately call legitimate development for 
fragile states. In order to create functioning states, from states otherwise characterized 
by fragility, the state must be sovereign in the eyes of, first, its citizens and 
subsequently the international community. In this context, sovereignty is understood 
as the de facto capabilities of a state to provide for its citizens rather than the de jure 
status assigned and recognized by the international community, such as the UN 
(Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 3), and is thus the accumulated legitimacy gained by the 
state from its capacities to execute state functions, of economic, social and political 
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nature, coherently (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 7, 164); or more precisely, the state’s 
ability to effectively govern on behalf of its citizens (Kaplan 2008: 50). 
   
At last, we will argue that in combination the two books propose a similar idea of the 
timeframe and planning of development in fragile states. Kaplan proposes an overall 
goal of reaching self-sustaining governance systems within a reasonable amount of 
time. Kaplan as well argues that it is important to prioritize principles according to 
needs and local contexts to fit circumstances of a given country. (Kaplan 2008: 50) 
Ghani and Lockhart argue that the goal of a fully functioning sovereign state by 
fulfilling all principles is to be reached using a method of prioritization according to 
context. What is important is to set up specific timelines, and thus be aware that 
touching upon only some dimensions are short-term, why it is necessary to address 
“ ll     d          w          d   -  r  fr   w rk” to achieve the goal of a 
sovereign state and thus implied development. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 178) We 
thus propose that in combining the two theories in a common theoretical framework, 
we address the process of development towards an expectation of long-term change, 
but are aware that due to prioritization, short-term change can occur. However, 
although we confer to this approach, we acknowledge that this is a vague stance and 
that the definition of short-term, medium-term and long-term is interpretable. 
  
We believe that in combination, the two books provide us with the strongest 
understanding of development in fragile states. Through the creation of the theoretical 
framework, we have chosen to only approach our subject of investigation 
theoretically, whereby we do not include practical experience related to the strategies 
we examine or incorporate experiences or knowledge on country-level and 
implementation in our analysis. Both books are divided into three parts, where the 
third part in both books are containing case studies and examples focusing on 
practical aspects of building and implementing a framework for development in 
fragile states. We have decided not to use these third parts of the books, due to 
focusing our project solely on theoretical aspects of development strategies. Having 
this approach to our empirical data, we are also aware that it is guiding the way we 
approach our empirical data. We have been working with our empirical data from the 
perspective of our theoretical standpoint, which thus means that there might exist 
aspects in the documents, which we do not include that can have an impact on the 
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overall coherence of the strategies. This will affect and reflect the findings in our 
analysis and thus what we will be able to conclude in the end of the project.  
2.4 Fragile states as a key concept 
We will in the following section elaborate on the concept of fragile states, which we 
believe is necessary to reflect on in working with this project. 
 
The concept of fragile states has been brought to our concern during this project, since 
there are several definitions that point to different directions and conclusions. It is 
primarily due to the complex nature of the concept fragility, as well as the relatively 
recent establishment of the concept within development discourse, especially within 
donor communities. With a point of departure in Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-
Paulino’s publication on Fragile States: Causes, Costs and Responses, we will in the 
following section provide a methodological discussion on the concepts of and 
approaches to fragility, which we will later be applying as an analytical keyword of 
the following analysis.  
 
It is argued that the term fragile concerns states or territories whose existence is 
highly threatened: “        x r    c   , w  r         d  c         x     r f  c        
any normal degree, they can even be labelled    ‘f  l d       ’” (Naudé, McGillivray 
& Santos-Paulino 2011: 5). Also, due to circumstances characterized by high levels of 
poverty and unequal distribution of wealth, fragile states are exposed and vulnerable 
to a range of both internal and external shocks, such as internal war and conflict, thus 
jeopardizing the stability of the countries as well as development prospects. In worst 
case scenario this can lead to state failures or state collapses (Fukuda-Parr in 
Mavrotas 2010: 124-126). 
  
Dividing the world in a hierarchical order has created many discussions on the 
concepts of ‘state failure’. Being conceptualized as either quasi-states, failed, failing 
or collapsed, opinions on how to understand these variations vary immensely. Being 
either affected by the level of statehood, international recognition, internal dynamics 
or foreign impact the concepts vary as well according to the diversity of such states. 
Important to keep in mind is the overtly normative nature of such concepts, as well as 
from where these concepts are derived and what they are used upon. Trying to nuance 
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the discourse, the definition of a fragile state is thus a recent concept used within the 
donor community. The concept fragility has as well had different meanings and 
complexities attached to it, which we will elaborate on further in this section. (Suhrke 
& Chaudhary 2011: 249-250) 
 
One of the most well-known ways of distinguishing between concepts of development 
stages is the World Bank’s economic classification system, rating countries based on 
per capita income (GDP), respectively: low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-
middle-income, and high-income states, thus being a static, economic, income-based 
classification of states. Using this method of distinguishing between state 
classifications, one would point towards the low- and middle-income states in order to 
identify fragile states. (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 8) However, as 
will be elaborated in this section, this type of classification might not be an all-
encompassing, universally applicable instrument for measuring state fragility. Thus, 
by examining how the concept of the development status of countries has changed 
over time, take the World Bank’s socioeconomic classification system as an example, 
it may be relevant to discuss some of the causes or explanations of what can be 
termed state fragility. (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 5) 
 
Naudé et al. identify four broad, but interrelated, determinants for the concept of 
fragility: conflict, low developmental status, vulnerability, and a non-developmental 
state (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 5). We will in the following 
section elaborate on each determinant and discuss how these individually add to the 
discussion on the concept of fragility. 
 
A common determinant of fragility is the presence of, or the potential for, conflict. 
There are various ways of measuring levels and degrees of conflict. Among others, 
The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) describes four types of conflicts that can 
change a country’s status from a fragile to a failed state: revolutionary wars, ethnic 
wars, adverse regime changes, genocides and politicides. From 1955 to 2006 PITF 
has compiled data that shows how, based on the occurrence of the previously 
mentioned types of conflicts, no less than 139 ‘state failure events’ across 107 
countries have taken place. In an appendix, in Naudé et al., from 2006 offered by 
PITF, showing a list of countries that are in a state of serious conflict or state failure, 
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we can identify six member states of g7+
4
  (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 
2011: 23). Thus, conflict can be considered a major cause for state fragility, by 
undermining authority, legitimacy, and limits development opportunities for the state. 
In this respect, Naudé et al. suggest the following causality; when states are fragile or 
weak, due to low development status, this itself can lead to conflict, which then again 
leads to further fragility through the processes of conflict, creating a “vicious cycle of 
underdevelopment – ‘  p v r y  r p’” (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 
8). 
  
In the following, we will highlight the importance of the implications of various 
contemporary approaches to measure the degree, to which states can be classified as 
being in a low developmental status. Since the establishment of the UN and the 
Bretton Wood Institutions it has been of concern to identify low developmental states, 
however these attempts to identify, classify, and measure levels of fragility in fragile 
states have varied (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 8). Based on the 
socioeconomic classifications provided by the World Bank, the income-based 
measurements, it may be argued that the reason for low- or middle income states
5
 to 
be regarded as fragile is due to substantial state debt:  
 
“States with high debt burdens most often do not have the resources to respond 
to mitigation of poverty or the potential impacts of external shocks. The IMF and 
World Bank, since 1996, identify a category of states that are both poor and 
   v ly   d b  d (HIP )”. (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 8-9)  
 
The IMF has identified 41 states that qualify or potentially qualify as HIPCs
6
 (Naudé, 
McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 24). By recognizing that it is insufficient to 
determine state fragility from different measurements within the concepts of conflict 
and low developmental status, we will now add into the discussion an additional 
determinant of fragile states, namely vulnerability. 
 
While some of the indicators of development or classifications of fragility apply to 
different countries, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are relevant to point 
                                                        
4 Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Somalia. 
5 Of which all g7+ countries are present. 
6 Of which 13 are g7+ countries: Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Cóte d’ivoire, Liberia, Somalia, Togo. 
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out as examples of the need to consider the dimension of vulnerability, because of 
their particular vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks and natural hazards, the latter 
due to fragile natural environments. Two examples could be: the Environmental 
Performance Index (EPI) measuring the environmental performance of states to 
determine state fragility from an environmental point of view (Naudé, McGillivray & 
Santos-Paulino 2011: 9). In the bottom quintile of this index are seven of the g7+ 
states to be found
7
 (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 25). Secondly, the 
Happy Planet Index (HPI) uses indicators such as the subjective satisfaction with life, 
life expectancy, and the ‘ecological footprint’ of a country (Naudé, McGillivray & 
Santos-Paulino 2011: 10). In the bottom quintile of the index based on the HPI are six 
of the g7+ states
8
 (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 25). However, 
vulnerability is also more than environment, despite being the most dominant focus, 
and is thus defined as: 
 
“From the common definitional elements, it is clear that vulnerability relates to 
an undesirable outcome (e.g., vulnerability to poverty, vulnerability to food 
insecurity, or vulnerability to natural hazards) and that such vulnerability is 
d      ‘ xp   r       z rd ’, w  c  c     ‘p r  rb      .’” (Naudé, 
McGillivray & Santos 2011: 12).  
 
Vulnerability can thus be categorized in economic, social, environmental or political 
aspects and is referring “          ’  p       l    b        v ly  ff c  d by f   r  
c      .” (Naudé, McGillivray & Santos 2011: 10) 
 
Finally, what Naudé et al. advocate for is that the quality and efficiency of state 
governance ultimately matter for the development status within the state as well as to 
the degree to which it may be fragile or vulnerable, despite its high development 
status. Naudé et al. thus lastly emphasize a non-developmental state as the last 
determinant of state fragility. State orientation, thus providing the necessary 
institutional foundations for development, is a crucial determinant for limiting 
fragility. The indicators of a non-developmental state is thereby more about what is 
needed, than what is lacking, compared to the other three determinants of fragility. 
However, this is a historically highly debated subject, as to whether the state must 
                                                        
7 Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi 
8 Cóte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi 
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play a dominant or minimal role in society. In the discussion on fragile states the 
concept of liberal democracy, as both the means and goal to emancipate states from 
fragility and achieve progress of development, focuses on the need of ‘good 
governance’ in the sense of accountability, transparency and economic freedoms. 
(Naudé, McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011, 14) A developmental state is thus 
defined according to its objective of progressively realizing above-mentioned criteria. 
Identifying fragile states by the concepts of a non-developmental state, using data on 
political violence, absolute and progressive service delivery and democratic 
governance, Brown & Stewart in Naudé et al. identify 11 countries failing in at least 
two of the three dimensions, where three out of 11 belongs to the g7+
9
. (Naudé, 
McGillivray & Santos-Paulino 2011: 15-16)  
 
We have in this section showed various ways of measuring fragility and identifying 
fragile states.  As demonstrated through an examination of various indices indicated 
in this section it is now clear that the term fragile state is fragmented and seeks to 
cover a large heterogeneous group. As seen, member states of the self-defined group 
of fragile states, the g7+, are represented differently in the indices mentioned, thereby 
exemplifying the diverse interpretations of state fragility. We will thus take the above-
mentioned aspects into account when using the concept of fragile states throughout 
our project. What we take from this section is that common to the many different 
views on the contested concept, it is the diversity of approaches as well as the 
diversity of states and how these are interrelated to the point that not one approach is 
right for all states.  
2.5 Strategy of analysis and discussion 
Our strategy of analysis and discussion is shaped by deduction. This means that we in 
the following chapter will present our theoretical framework built on a hypothesis on 
development in fragile states, which we wish to apply on concrete examples, in this 
case the development strategies (Bryman 2012: 24). In the analysis we will answer 
the second working question, by analysing our empirical data through our theoretical 
framework. The analysis of this project is structured according to the theoretical 
framework. Therefore it will be split into two main parts: the national context and the 
international context. In this way it is our theoretical framework that is guiding our 
                                                        
9 Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Burundi. 
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analysis and the coding of our empirical data that will provide us with the answers. 
We will thus compare the documents from each strategy, MDG and New Deal, in 
how they relate to the criteria of our theory. We will end the two parts of the analysis 
with a concluding remark to make our findings clear. The findings of the analysis will 
lead to a discussion of the compatibility between the two strategies and thereby 
answer our third working question.  
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3. Theoretical framework  
We will in the following chapter answer our first working question; With the aim of 
development in fragile states, how can we propose a theoretical framework? This will 
be done by explaining our theoretical framework for this project with a point of 
departure in Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World 
and Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development as presented in the 
methodology chapter.  
 
We have chosen to divide the theoretical framework into a national and an 
international context. Authors of the books, Ghani & Lockhart and Kaplan, emphasize 
the importance of development processes occurring on a national basis rather than by 
international interference. Within the two contexts we will present three actors of 
development that we have identified as essential in promoting and undertaking 
development in fragile states. Within the national focus we have identified two main 
actors in creating development: the state and the civil society. Within the international 
context we have identified the international community as an actor for development. 
Each context and thereby actor will be elaborated on individually by explaining the 
tasks required of each actor as well as how they are interconnected. The theoretical 
framework made up by these contexts and actors should be seen as our theoretical 
proposition on how to most effectively produce development in fragile states. Given 
this theoretical point of departure, the success of our framework is dependent on each 
actor being capable of and willing to follow the roles and responsibilities to be 
described in the following sections. 
3.1 National context 
In the following sections, the national context will be explained through elaboration 
on the responsibilities and role of the state and civil society in creating legitimate 
development in fragile states. 
3.1.1 The state 
From a national perspective, we have chosen to look at the role of the state and civil 
society in order to facilitate legitimate development in fragile states. In this context, 
the state is highlighted as both an important actor as well as a means of development. 
The state is a development actor in the sense that it must facilitate state functions that 
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impact both the institutional system as well as the citizens of the state. Consequently, 
there is a strong interdependent relation between the state and its citizens and civil 
society, which will be further investigated in this and the following section on the role 
of civil society in creating legitimate development. In order for a state to gain 
legitimacy, citizens must support and enforce the legitimacy of state functions and 
thus the state becomes a means of creating development with the citizens as 
development actors. Citizens indirectly facilitate development through the means of a 
state, however, only if the state is sufficiently able to accommodate the needs of the 
people, consequently resulting in citizens’ support of the state into legitimacy. 
 
In the following sections, the state as a development actor in facilitating legitimate 
development in fragile states will be explored. We have chosen to divide this 
elaboration into three main development target areas with sub-point to illustrate the 
overarching nature of those main points. The three main development target areas of 
the state as a development actor are: public management, citizens and international 
cooperation. This division, extracted from the theories of Kaplan, Ghani & Lockhart 
and contextualized anew into our current theoretical framework, is to highlight key 
areas that make up the perceived legitimacy of a state. However, any actors and their 
responsibilities explained here should not be seen as isolated entities independent 
from each other, but instead be regarded as highly intertwined and influential on and 
by each other. 
3.1.1.1 Public management 
In handling institutional functions, the government must relate to different sections of 
public management. To start with, the state needs to manage public finances: as 
public finances are the vehicle through which a state can effectively realize public 
goals. One way for the state to generate revenues is by taxation. Public finances relate 
both to the state’s ability to create a coherent state budget but also to how to 
effectively execute that budget into practical function (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 135-
136). Consequently, a state’s effectiveness in handling public finances is measured by 
the state’s capability to manage and put forward public assets in benefit of the 
collective good of the state and its citizens (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 156). 
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In addition to managing public finance, the state should also be capable of facilitating 
the formation of a non-hostile market environment in order to allow economic growth 
and expansion of public finances. The state should create market conditions that either 
lower the risks of private businesses or increase returns thus resulting in more people 
investing and engaging in market activities (Kaplan 2008: 61). The state’s capacity to 
regulate the market environment is also influenced by the state’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of its citizens as the market cannot fully function without certain elements; such 
as security of people and property, education and legitimate rule of law to actually set 
and govern market conditions. The goal of a competitive market is not to foster 
employment. Employment should be produced on behalf of private businesses. Rather 
the main goal of a free market is to form the relation between the state and 
corporations (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 150-55) and reassert the state’s supposed 
legitimacy and power and capacity to regulate market conditions.  
 
Further of importance for strong market conditions is effective management and 
allocation of resources and infrastructure in order to make development as cost-
effective as possible. Means of transportation, water supply, and communication 
among others are key facilitators of ensuring both an effective market but also the 
livelihood of citizens. Effective management of these public goods are contributory to 
other development processes such as addressing spatial inequalities by spreading 
resources, knowledge and health more cost-effectively and thus the state’s 
responsibility for competently managing resources and infrastructure not only affects 
state functions but civil society as well. The capacity to successfully and efficiently 
managing resources and infrastructure thus adds to the legitimacy of the state as a 
capable development actor as perceived both domestically and internationally. (Ghani 
& Lockhart 2008: 147-148). 
3.1.1.2 Citizens   
In addition to public management of finances and resources, the state must further 
fulfil a role towards its citizens; by enmeshing state into civil society. The beneficial 
objective of the formation of a strong relation between state and society is in the 
interest of both the state and its citizens. Elections effectively enmesh state and its 
citizens as it theoretically forces the state to be responsive to society. However, as the 
practical reality of many fragile states is high levels of corruption and manipulation, 
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other measures are necessary in order to create dependence between state and citizens 
(Kaplan 2008: 51). Taxation is another way of creating mutual obligations between 
the state and its subjects. The government becomes dependent on its tax-paying 
citizens and the citizens consequently can make demands in exchange for paying 
taxes (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 51-52). Taxation, however, is part of the 
interrelationship between state and citizens and the balance of taxations in exchange 
of services to the public is to be negotiated in order for the state to not lose 
sovereignty and gain and sustain trust and empowerment from its citizens (Ghani & 
Lockhart 2008: 126). Another aspect of developing the state, in fragile states or in 
states with weak state institutions, is the accumulation and investment in human 
capital. Investment into increased knowledge, education and health is contributory to 
giving a national population a competitive advantage (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 139-
144) both in relation to internal as well as external markets. 
 
As the relation between state and society is a relation of exchange, it is appropriate to 
consider how the state must politicize according to its subjects in order to gain 
legitimacy through social policies. As citizenship rights are crucial to internal 
stability, the formation of such rights is an obvious way of establishing more equal 
opportunities among citizens, thus creating a sense of shared belonging to a national 
space (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 144) across ethnic, social and economic differences. 
However, the state must simultaneously keep in mind that it functions on behalf of its 
people and state should be structured bottom up around identity groups in order to 
most effectively act according to the interests of the broad population (Kaplan 2008: 
53-55) which is crucial in order for the state to be perceived as legitimate. The 
argument behind this is that cohesive identity groups are more likely to self-enforce 
and abide by the rules accepted by the group (Kaplan 2008: 51). The state must 
therefore fulfil its citizens’ aspirations for inclusion (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 124), 
which is best achieved through social policies rather than economic planning. This 
does not mean that all state policies, economic as well as social, should not, ideally, 
be characterized by transparency, accountability and inclusion and serve the interest 
of the people (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 125). 
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3.1.1.3 International cooperation 
This theoretical framework has so far argued for a people- and domestically centred 
approach to developing fragile states. However, though the emphasis is on 
development through a national perspective first and foremost, it has also been argued 
that no one development process can be seen in either a political or social vacuum and 
thereby the state will under any circumstances need to relate to the international 
community. We have also argued for the importance of consideration of local and 
regional contexts. We and the authors that have inspired this theoretical framework 
are far from denouncing the relevance and existence of foreign aid and supranational 
constellations. In the following section, the state’s role in relation to the international 
cooperation will be shortly elaborated to give an impression of this relationship’s 
influence on national development processes. 
 
No national development processes is exclusively within a domestic context. The 
question is thus not whether or not a fragile state should relate to the international 
community but rather how, through international cooperation. Foreign aid, as an 
example, should be welcomed as long as governance and sovereignty is never 
consequently placed on the international community; as this would effectively 
undermine the legitimacy of the state (Kaplan 2008: 49-50). However, it can be 
necessary for a fragile state to engage in supranational constellations if the state is 
unable to provide certain services on its own.  
 
Regional cooperation is one recommended strategy of allowing the international 
community influence on national sovereignty; however, sovereignty ought to be 
shared by all engaging states rather than handed over to one or some. Regional and 
international cooperation, multinational companies and states, in the domestic 
approach could be welcomed as long as it allows for the single states to acquire 
functions it would either not be able to on its own or more cost-effectively. The 
imperative of international cooperation is to expand into a larger market with 
common standards and better governance across national borders as well as social 
policies, overcoming identity or social issues prevalent in single national state 
(Kaplan 2008: 56-59). The main point of reference to how the fragile state should 
interact internationally in terms of development is thus to only encourage 
international cooperation, and interaction with non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs), when this cooperation as a result builds up the relation domestically between 
state and society. (Kaplan 2008: 60) This is to prevent dependency and loss of 
sovereignty to non-state actors, which would undermine national development. 
Alongside successfully managing state functions, the focus on national context and 
competences is thus also a focal point in creating legitimate development in fragile 
states. 
3.1.2 Civil society  
In addition to the state being an important actor in development of fragile states, civil 
society too makes up a crucial part of the national processes of facilitating legitimate 
development. Though briefly touched upon in outlining the importance of enmeshing 
state and society in each other as well as the need for social policies formulated by the 
state, we will here, more thoroughly elaborate on the counter-responsibility civil 
society has in relation to the state. As the state has an obligation to make room for and 
include civil society, citizens in return have an obligation to fulfil their role as active 
participants in society. 
 
With a point of departure in the literature described in the introduction to this 
framework, we will here propose aspects to the role of civil society as a development 
actor in creating legitimate development in fragile states. An overarching theme, 
relating to civil society as actors, is a responsibility to act in national cooperation with 
the state. As participants in society each citizen will have certain responsibilities both 
to other citizens and to the nation or state (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 145,172). These 
responsibilities are of course only legitimate or valid if and when the state 
simultaneously provides an institutional state-framework that includes civil society 
and ultimately acts in accordance to civil society (Kaplan 2008: 55). We have chosen 
to divide the following section into two main development target areas of 
responsibility: participation and implementation and evaluation. In this distinction, 
civil society contains the social actors of co-facilitating, along with the state, 
legitimate development. 
3.1.2.1 Participation 
Civil society and the citizens of a nation-state have a responsibility to be critical of 
the status quo and current affairs of the state. Further, in order for the state to be able 
to politicize and act according to the wishes and needs of identity groups, citizens 
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must organize and thereby create a common voice in the articulation of responses to 
tensions in society and thus imply or articulate needs for change (Ghani & Lockhart 
2008: 125). 
 
Civil society further has a responsibility to participate actively in society in terms of 
providing inputs into rules and regulations as these rules ultimately affect the lives of 
citizens (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 172). An example of doing so is by utilizing state 
inclusiveness by participating in elections (Kaplan 2008: 51). Citizens have a 
responsibility in becoming active collaborators with the state by contributing with 
skills and knowledge thus co-shaping society and as a result taking part in the 
production of legitimate public value (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 135). Actors of civil 
society consequently have a responsibility to adhere to those national laws. In 
practice, rules and regulations remain as imperfect constellations of society regardless 
of a country’s degree of development and thus, “[t]here is never a perfect fit between 
the formal rules (which exist on paper and in statute books) and informal ones (which 
people form on daily basis)” (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 180). However, citizens’ 
adherence to both formal and informal rules greatly depends on the legitimacy of the 
institutions articulating those rules. The legitimacy and broad support granted by civil 
society is what changes legal prescriptions into legal practice which subsequently 
should lead to stability and coherence through being common sets of rules and norms 
(Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 126). 
 
The state should, ideally, regulate market conditions and foster a non-hostile, 
competitive market, however, citizens also have a responsibility for market 
participation according to those conditions. Though civil society and businesses are 
not the same, we here argue that the two are still intertwined, as citizens are the ones 
ultimately responsible for fostering businesses. This proposes that neither state, 
businesses nor civil society can effectively function without the others. Conditioned 
by the state’s capacity to benevolently regulating market conditions, “businesses and 
private investments are crucial in order to facilitate development” (Kaplan 2008: 61). 
However, as argued earlier, employment is to be generated by private businesses and 
entrepreneurships initiated by civil society. It is thus the responsibility of the citizens 
to initiate such in order to generate wealth and foster development (Kaplan 2008: 61). 
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3.1.2.2 Implementation & evaluation 
In continuation of citizens’ responsibility for participation, one related aspect is 
implementation and evaluation. The responsibility of civil society ought not to be 
seen as a static responsibility but as a continuous obligation. Provided that the state is 
capable and willing to transparently provide insight into development processes, civil 
society has a responsibility to take part in the implementation of development 
processes and subsequently the evaluation of those processes. Further they ought also 
to contribute in providing feedback of these processes and thereby influence future 
development process (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 192).  
3.2 International context 
In the following section, the international context will be explained through 
elaboration on the role of the international community as an actor in creating 
legitimate development in fragile states. 
3.2.1 International community 
The role of the international community as an actor for development should be 
reflected upon as cooperation on the terms of the fragile state. Development in fragile 
states is necessary to be approached by the state being the actor of development 
supported by the international community rather than having development imposed 
by foreign states. (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 169) We have chosen to divide the 
following section into two main development target areas: foreign aid and security.  
3.2.1.1 Foreign aid 
The international community can be an important actor in the development of a 
fragile state; through, for example, foreign aid. Aid can come in many forms and aid 
is highly contested as a beneficial tool in development. The conditions for receiving 
aid from the international community are therefore important to keep in mind. Global 
aid has had a history of undermining a country’s sovereignty (Ghani & Lockhart 
2008: 169), which is why the terms of giving and receiving aid have to be re-
evaluated to avoid undermining state sovereignty. Since, “[s]tates cannot be created 
from the outside” (Kaplan 2008: 49), countries must be the primary actors of their 
own development. However, support in the shape of externally provided aid can 
initiate this process (Kaplan 2008: 49-50). Aid in form of external financial resources 
is acknowledged to sometimes be necessary to kick-start development processes but is 
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never a sufficient solution in enhancing sustainable development (Kaplan 2008: 184). 
Aid should reinforce and be a supplement to a state’s capacities to finance their own 
development expenses. Therefore aid should never exceed the capital that the state is 
able to generate i.e. through taxation. Matching the level of aid from the international 
community with the state’s internal revenues will secure that states do not end up in a 
dependency on foreign aid and thereby promote development towards self-
sufficiency. Alongside this modified way of providing aid, it is also important that aid 
focuses on securing the state’s development towards capacities of ensuring a more 
financially stable situation locally. Therefore, if the international community abandon 
the state as the receiver of aid in favour of NGOs, a situation is created where foreign 
aid takes over the role of government and become the sole provider of financial 
means thus creating a dependency on aid instead of securing a long-term stabile 
financial flow in the fragile state. (Kaplan 2008: 52). Aid can by these accounts not be 
the sole engine in promoting development and must be given and received with 
meticulous considerations on how it will impact the relation between state and society 
(Kaplan 2008: 60).   
 
Here alignment of policies becomes essential as cooperation between the international 
community and the fragile state must emphasize alignment towards national visions 
and goals. This can be done through co-production or conditional management, in 
which a country and its international partners agree on shared responsibilities, rights 
and explicit conditionality. (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 171) The initial phase of 
cooperation between the international community and fragile states should thus be 
focused on how to work through domestic players in a unified strategy to ensure 
accountability and alignment. (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 177) 
3.2.1.2 Security 
The international community can have a role in maintaining or creating security both 
locally and globally. Actions taken by the international community to create and 
maintain security are important to promote state accountability, regionalism and 
facilitating negotiation instead of further conflict. 
 
Legitimacy and accountability are often lacking in fragile states and here the 
international community can act to help create a stable and secure situation where 
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development can flourish. The international community can, “support gradual 
reforms that does not threaten status quo, but allow for future changes to seep in and 
affect the relation between state and society” (Kaplan 2008: 63). Support from and 
cooperation with the international community is thus with a focus on integrating the 
state further in society while also enhancing the relation between state and 
international community. (Kaplan 2008: 63) The international community can thereby 
act as an external stakeholder and thus affect the state’s capacity to make and 
maintain rules and regulations. The international community, however, also has a 
responsibility of affecting the way countries are perceived internationally (Ghani & 
Lockhart 2008: 176) – particularly in terms of being perceived as legitimate and 
sovereign. One of the biggest resources the international community can provide is 
the symbolic gesture of acknowledging countries as legitimate domestic players in the 
international systems. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 177) 
 
One way of providing further accountability is through regional cooperation, which 
may help make use of the advantages of surrounding countries. Cooperation within a 
region can create accountability among states and create security by providing 
interdependence in the region and reducing regional tensions. These regional 
supranational institutions can help solve internal challenges in single nation-states by 
cooperation and thus enhance stability across regions. Regionalism can be promoted 
through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) or as financial aid, by financially stronger 
states within the region but should never be the sole supporting factor in regional 
cooperation. (Kaplan 2008: 56, 61) 
 
The fact that legitimacy from the international community is a sought-after attribute 
for fragile states renders the international community with the capacity to influence 
states’ behaviour in potential security-destabilising situations. In order to be perceived 
as legitimate internationally, states on the verge of conflict must act according to 
conflict-reducing strategies set by the international community. This means that the 
international community holds the possibility and/or responsibility of being a 
mediator or referee in altering the status quo of country systems in case of conflict or 
other kind of fragility between national stakeholders. The international community 
thus holds the ability to facilitate negotiations in the alteration of existing rules and 
regulations towards a common understanding. The goal thereby is to avoid violence, 
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bring the process of conflict to closure and create local and global security. (Ghani & 
Lockhart 2008: 183). 
Concluding remark on the theoretical framework 
In this chapter, we have answered our first working question by explaining our 
theoretical framework for this project, and further elaborated on the role of three main 
actors for development in fragile states; the state, civil society and the international 
community. In highlighting these actors, we have argued that the two former are 
considered to be the primary development actors, whereas the latter has a secondary, 
supportive role. This will be evident in the use of our theoretical framework 
henceforth. 
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4. Analysis 
In the following chapter will answer our working question two: How do the MDG 
strategy and New Deal strategy take into account the role of state, civil society, and 
the international community in facilitating development? In our theoretical 
framework, we have proposed several actors and their responsibilities in facilitating 
development of fragile states. We have argued that legitimate development in fragile 
states happens mainly in a national context but can be supported by the international 
community, in an international context. In the following sections, we shall examine 
and analyse the MDG development strategy as well as the New Deal development 
strategy in accordance with the development proposed in our theoretical framework. 
Examining the two strategies will subsequently result in a discussion on their 
compatibility, presented in the next chapter.  
4.1 The state 
As a starting point, a closer examination of the national context of developing fragile 
states will be conducted. Within this examination, we will analyse how the two 
development strategies, the MDGs and the New Deal, relate to the parameters of 
development processes under the heading, the state.  
4.1.1 Public management 
Under this heading, we will present our analytical findings of our proposed theoretical 
categories, respectively; public finances, market conditions and resources and 
infrastructure. 
 
Both the MDG and New Deal strategy involves considerations for diverse public 
management in their respective approaches. In the perspective of management of 
public finances the two strategies theoretically cover the basics of our definition of the 
goals of successful public management of finances: they both emphasize being able to 
cohesively plan a public budget as well as executing it into practice. However, there 
are differences in the development actors described. 
 
The MDG strategy, under several of its goals, describes how public finances are to be 
managed. Goal one, ‘eradicate extreme poverty and hunger’, describes the state’s role 
in managing economic and social initiatives, which include planning, management 
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and monitoring progress (UN Secretary General 2001: 18-19). However, the exact 
development actors are not explicitly clarified in the goals, though under goal eight, 
‘develop a global partnership for development’, the responsibility for reaching the 
goals, amongst others, of, “[d]isciplined macroeconomic policies and fiscal policy, 
including clear goals for the mobilization of tax and non-tax revenues” and “[w]ell 
functioning and diverse financial systems that allocate savings to those capable of 
investing efficiently […]”, seem to be attributed both the state and the international 
community (UN Secretary General 2001: 25-26). Hence, the state is not mentioned as 
the main development actor in managing public finances effectively, which thus 
undermines the state’s legitimacy and sovereignty according to our theoretical 
framework. Because the state is not the main body in charge of initiating and 
sustaining development, but seen in collaboration with the international community, it 
is likely to be perceived as not being de facto sovereign and thereby losing legitimacy, 
which in turn could lead to development but not legitimate development. 
 
In the New Deal strategy, the relations between the development actors are described 
differently. PSG four, ‘economic foundations’, outlines how the sovereign state, along 
with civil society, is to be in charge of monitoring income equality across regions 
(The Dialogue 1 2013: 14-15). In PSG five, ‘revenues and services’, it is further 
explained how the state needs to establish monopoly and capacity to collect taxes as 
well as providing quality public administration and distribution of services. Though 
the state is linked as having responsibility of providing these state functions, it is 
underlined that civil society is to have a role in aspects of decision making and 
monitoring (The Dialogue 1 2013: 16-17). Civil society’s enmeshment into state 
functions is clear in both the New Deal document itself, “[…] one national vision and 
one plan to transition out of fragility. This vision and plan will be country-owned and 
-led, developed in consultation with civil society” (g7+ 1 2011: 2) and the subsequent 
document on proposed indicators and actors in monitoring progress (The Dialogue 1 
2013: 16-17). 
 
Where the MDG strategy articulated the role of the state to a downplayed, 
collaborative effort together with the international community, the New Deal strategy 
has a much larger focus on the state as being the main, sovereign actor. The state is 
further described in its relation to and with civil society, which in our theoretical 
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terms would more likely produce legitimate development. This is due to the argument 
that sovereignty is not handed over to international actors but instead is in the primary 
hands of the state, and through its enmeshment into civil society, its people. If the 
state is then able to cohesively manage public finances, it should, theoretically, in turn 
gain legitimacy from both civil society, due to its capacity to administrate finances 
efficiently, and the international community, due to having gained a higher level of 
sovereignty. 
 
The capacity and willingness to regulate market conditions is not an independent 
function of the state alone. It has been argued throughout this project that the state has 
highly interrelated functions with its relation to civil society, but also around 
functions with the international community. In that sense, governing market 
conditions is an extension of the state’s ability to manage and organize itself. 
 
The MDG strategy makes reference to market conditions by addressing food security 
and regulation of the market as a responsibility to lie with as much the international 
community as the national state. Goal one describes how, “[…] food, agricultural 
trade and overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all 
through a fair and just world trade system” (UN Secretary General 2001: 20). The 
developed countries, rather than the state of a developing country, are further 
suggested to have the final responsibility to allow developing states into the world 
market. (UN Secretary General 2001: 27) This adds to the argument made in the 
foregoing section, that the hand-over of sovereignty from the state to the international 
community undermines the legitimacy of the state both nationally and internationally. 
 
The New Deal only references market conditions in describing the need for 
monitoring food price stability under the overarching theme of improving economic 
foundations and livelihoods (The Dialogue 1 2013: 14). The development actor is 
unspecified but monitoring is to be done by administrative data, which we understand 
as hinting towards the state being responsible for this task. Though market 
management is, arguably, inadequately accounted for and therefore does not directly 
concur with our proposition of regulation of market as an important state function in 
creating legitimate development, the New Deal strategy does, however maintain a 
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national focus, where the MDGs promote a shared national and international 
approach. 
 
In relation to management of resources and infrastructure, the MDG strategy 
proposes the state, in cooperation with the international community, as the main 
actors. However, it should be noted that rhetorically, the state is proposed as the main 
development actor with UN’s functions being ‘supporting’, ‘ensuring’, ‘helping’ etc. 
In this sense, the state has a dominant role in administrating resources and thus keeps 
a level of sovereignty, though the international community and the UN is heavily 
mentioned as an influence sharing elements of sovereignty (UN Secretary General 
2001: 32-35). The international community is urged to direct their aid on building up 
infrastructures of developing, in particular landlocked, countries (UN Secretary 
General 2001: 30). This, however, does not necessarily remove sovereignty from the 
states themselves, if aid is directed through the state, with strong ties to civil society, 
instead of being lead around it. 
 
The New Deal strategy has a much more articulated focus on resource management 
and infrastructure. In addition to the overall methodological stance on state 
sovereignty based on consultation with civil society, PSG four suggests that a 
regulatory framework for managing natural resources should be monitored by both 
state and civil society (The Dialogue 1 2013: 14-15). Likewise, access to “key 
infrastructure related to transportation, communication, water and energy” is to be 
monitored by state in cooperation with civil society (The Dialogue 1 2013: 14).  
4.1.2 Citizens 
Under this heading, we will present our analytical findings of our proposed theoretical 
categories, respectively; enmeshing state into civil society and social policies. 
 
The MDG strategy calls out inclusive policies in relation to democracy, thus 
enmeshing state into society. In order for a democracy, and the emergence of a 
democratic state, to fully function, good governance need to be present, this is 
desperately dependent on political participation from citizens. However, for citizens 
to be able to take an active role in policies and elections, the state needs to emphasize 
strategies of inclusion (UN Secretary General 2001: 4, 39-40); “people-centred 
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initiatives are crucial but must be supplemented with sound national policies” (UN 
Secretary General 2001: 3). This well coincides with our proposition of the 
importance of a strong state-citizen relationship. Although taxes are mentioned in the 
MDG strategy, they are not mentioned as a strategy of inclusion, which is one of the 
proposed functions. Rather, taxation is placed in context with the state’s ability to 
manage tax revenues and lowering medicine prices thus focusing on economy rather 
than social policy (UN Secretary General 2001: 24, 26). Further, the MDG strategy 
calls for a strong focus on equal education as a means of directly influencing health, 
fertility, poverty and improving overall development (UN Secretary General 2001: 
20). Whether or not this proposed development is of legitimate nature, according to 
our theoretical framework, would crucially depend on the overall inclusion of civil 
society into the state. 
 
PSG goal one, ‘legitimate politics’, in the New Deal strategy, strongly emphasizes 
fostering “inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution” (g7+ 1 2011: 2) thus 
being in agreement with our theoretical proposals of the importance of a dual 
responsibility from state and civil actors of allowing for participation in political 
matters as well as actively participating. This dual responsibility is further articulated, 
in the context of inclusiveness, under the entire goal relating to legitimate politics, 
which supports our notion of citizens grating legitimacy to the state and thereby to 
development processes (The Dialogue 1 2013: 7-8). However, like the MDG strategy, 
the New Deal relates taxations as an attribute of the state’s capacity of public 
management rather as a strategy of enmeshing state into society (The Dialogue 1 
2013: 16) as we propose as an effective approach of enhancing legitimate 
development. Further, our theoretical framework puts an emphasis on the presence of 
education and human capital as a goal, which is absent in the New Deal strategy. 
Though citizens are argued to be part of a reciprocal relation to the state, the state’s 
responsibility in strengthening and developing civil society, thereby ultimately itself, 
through their mutually beneficial relationship, is not explicitly articulated. This 
showcases a potential pitfall as it could be argued that the strategy, though 
emphasizing a dual relation, does not emphasize the two entities’ responsibilities to 
each other equally.  
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In extension of the state’s and civil society’s role in involving itself with society, we 
have further proposed that the state has a responsibility in politicizing accordingly in 
order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. We have argued that identity 
considerations and policies are important in order to establish social cohesion and 
internal stability: e.g. through social policies. 
 
The MDG strategy does not prioritise identity cohesion sufficiently, according to our 
theoretical framework, but rather focuses on conflict resolution and peacekeeping. 
From this perspective, the international community is given the responsibility to assist 
national states where they may falter in their efforts to independently manage conflict 
(UN Secretary General 2001: 11-14). Though we have emphasized that international 
cooperation does not necessarily have detrimental effects on legitimate development, 
we have also pointed out that international cooperation can, and should, focus on 
strengthening the relation between state and society.  
 
There is a different focus on identity politics in the New Deal development strategy. 
Emphasised as the main development actors are the state and civil society in the New 
Deal strategy (g7+ 1 2011: 1-2). Through these actors, it is theoretically to be 
believed that policies ideally would reflect both the interests of the state and civil 
society. This would likely also result in the creation of social policies provided that 
civil society is allowed by the state to articulate citizens’ needs and actively 
participate in doing so. In the New Deal strategy, PSG one argues that one factor that 
the establishment of legitimate politics is dependent on is, “social cohesion, social 
capital [and] intergroup relations” (The Dialogue 1 2013: 8). There is, arguably, a 
stronger focus on the societal cohesion of civil society and its relation and effects on 
the state, which according to our theoretical framework, is an aspect missing in the 
MDG strategy. 
4.1.3 International cooperation 
The MDG strategy has thus far been argued to largely suggest the state in constant 
cooperation with the international community, often with the UN, as the main 
development actor, where the New Deal has a larger national focus on state in 
cooperation with civil society and to a lesser extent the international community. 
Where the immediate thought would be that the New Deal more adequately, would 
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lead to legitimate development, it should be kept in mind that we have also argued 
that international cooperation could be encouraged if it in turn facilitates the 
development of national relations between the state and civil society. The 
fundamental incentive for our focus on national processes of development is the 
argument that legitimate development happens only if the state is perceived as a 
capable and sovereign development actor. However, even though the New Deal 
strategy puts emphasis on the national context, it also encourages international 
relations, such as regionalism, to help facilitate development more cost-effectively in 
context to tasks a fragile state would have difficulties managing themselves.  
 
It should, however, be kept in mind that regional cooperation between fragile states is 
just as much international cooperation as is cooperation with the UN. It can further be 
contested whether or to what extent a state loses legitimacy if it voluntarily surrenders 
some sovereignty by cooperating regionally or internationally. Whether or not the 
capacity and willingness to share sovereignty with institutions such as the UN or The 
Dialogue is ultimately an act of surrendering or utilizing sovereign power is also a 
matter of relevance in examining the state’s role in legitimate development. If 
perceived as an act of utilizing sovereignty, the UN as an example would, 
theoretically, be more likely to establish legitimate development than if the MDG 
strategy’s focus on international cooperation were to be perceived as an inefficiency 
of the state. The New Deal strategy’s approach to regional and international 
cooperation, as to whether or not it strengthens the strategy’s fit into our theoretical 
body, is likewise influenced by the perception of sovereignty. However, the sovereign 
state as an actor, with legitimacy in both policies and development, is crucially 
dependent on how the civil society perceives the state. We have up until now argued 
that the national context of creating legitimate development exist in the reciprocal 
relation between state and civil society. Having just explored the MDG and New Deal 
strategies’ emphasis on the state as a development actor, it is now appropriate to more 
closely examine the strategies’ view on civil society as a development actor. 
4.2 Civil society 
In the development strategies of the MDG and the New Deal, there are a variety of 
similarities and differences in approaching the role of civil society. We will now 
elaborate the national context of legitimate development by looking at the role of civil 
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society according to, respectively, the MDG and New Deal strategy. Responsibilities 
have been proposed to form the predominance of tasks related to civil society, with 
the sub-categories: participation and implementation & evaluation. Having looked at 
the role and responsibilities of the state, one half of the national context of 
development, we will now examine how the MDG and New Deal strategies relate to 
the responsibilities of civil society.  
4.2.1 Responsibility 
The MDG strategy emphasizes several responsibilities of civil society that are innate 
in the strategy’s approach to participation, implementation and evaluation; the three 
subcategories suggested in our theoretical framework. The MDG strategy encourages 
and promotes inclusive policies in handling nature and natural resources, resources 
towards education as well as information about health and diseases, which then 
implicitly would suggests that civil society ought to partake in the creation and 
implementation of such policies. (UN Secretary General 2001: 21-22). The MDG 
strategy further implicitly reflects responsibilities onto civil society by building on a 
strategy, which puts fundamental emphasis on the necessity of democracy as 
foundation for legitimate development. By promoting democratic thinking and 
institutions, the MDG strategy stresses the obligation of civil society to act within 
those democratic frames and comply in behaviour and level of participation. Thus 
emphasizing democracy ultimately shapes our perception of civil society’s 
responsibilities for participation in context to the MDG strategy.  
 
The New Deal strategy articulates the role and responsibilities of civil society 
differently by emphasizing how civil society is to be the main development actor in 
cooperation with the state e.g. by how the progress indicators of the strategy are 
selected through a bottom-up process; “the process of indicator selection and 
development to be guided by a country-led “b       p”  ppr  c ” (The Dialogue 1 
2013: 4). This indicates an emphasis on civil society, because they are a part of the 
country, as having a strong responsibility in taking part in creating developing and, 
more importantly, shaping strategies for legitimate development in fragile states. 
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4.2.1.1 Participation 
Responsibilities of participation emphasized in our theoretical framework are to be 
critical of the status quo of the state, provide inputs into rules and regulations and 
market participation.  
 
We have highlighted that civil society needs to create a common or if nothing less 
coherent, voice of articulating the wishes and needs of a potentially very diverse 
population. The MDG development strategy takes this aspect into account by 
focusing on the right to self-determination, which expresses a focus on the need for 
civil society to organize and express needs freely according to prevalent identity 
groups. The MDG strategy does, however, put this into context with, “peoples, which 
remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation” (UN General Assembly 1 
2000: 1) rather than articulating freedom of expression under more covert forms of 
state domination. The MDG strategy further highlights respect for diversity of belief, 
culture or languages between civil society groups and individuals (UN General 
Assembly 1 2000: 1-2), which promotes freedom for citizens to be able to express 
themselves according to other identity groups but not explicitly governments. The 
focus on self-determination is thus, arguably, not adequately described in context to 
our theoretical proposals, as we have placed importance on civil society commenting 
on not only relations to other identity groups but also its relation to the status quo of 
the state.    
 
The New Deal strategy has a strong emphasis on civil society and its duty to be 
critical. This can be extracted from, as an example, the proposed New Deal indicators 
of measuring the progress of the PSGs and the development in fragile states. Civil 
society’s responsibility and role in being critical, as part of the indicators, relate to a 
multitude of measuring aspects such as population’s perception of security and safety, 
satisfaction with performance of security institutions, justice institutions, experience 
of corruption, basic social service etc. (The Dialogue 1 2013: 9-17). In the New Deal 
strategy, it is apparent how the relation between state and civil society is 
interconnected. Because of this reciprocal relation and emphasis, the strategy uses 
civil society inclusively in assessing the condition and progress of developing the 
state. New Deal is thus working with a point of departure in the responsibility of civil 
society to be critical. It further, like the MDG strategy, focuses on social cohesion, 
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intergroup relationships and societal resilience and additionally statistics on violent 
disputes between groups as measurements of the development strategy (The Dialogue 
1 2013: 8). However, since the New Deal strategy more clearly communicates civil 
society’s, in cooperation with the state, responsibility and capacity to comment on not 
only intergroup relations but also civil society’s relation to the state, it coincides 
better with our theoretical proposals of such emphasis, than the MDG strategy and its 
lack of articulation on the relation between state, civil society and how they should 
each be able to comment on the status quo of the state. 
 
Though none of the strategies elaborately explains civil society’s responsibility to 
adhere to and contribute with inputs into rules and regulations, which we have 
proposed as being one of the key responsibilities for civil society. The MDG strategy 
mostly focuses on law adherence with reference to the relation between international 
and national communities rather than between states and civil societies. However, 
emphasizing law and rules as prerequisites to human security which, along with other 
policies, civil society should naturally adhere to in order for it to be legitimate and 
effective. The MDG strategy further places equal emphasis on “enhanced 
international cooperation in conflict prevention, and strengthened capacities to assist 
countries in building, keeping and restoring peace” (UN Secretary General 2001: 8). 
Thus the strategy grants importance on the international rather than the national 
context of development, and the role and responsibilities of civil society, even though 
it also officially proclaims that all processes should happen in unison with civil 
society “The entire United Nations family of Member States […] and civil society 
must join together to meet the lofty commitments that are embodied in the Millennium 
Declaration” (UN Secretary General 2001: 5). 
 
The New Deal strategy, does not explicitly elaborate on civil society’s responsibilities 
to adhere to the rule of law. They do, however, propose that one way of measuring 
political participation could be done by monitoring the percentage of people 
participating in lawful demonstrations (The Dialogue 1 2013: 7). In spite of explicit 
elaboration, the strategy’s focus on strong cooperation between state and civil society 
in developing a society which, whether it be in terms of laws or development, could 
be proposed to naturally result in citizens’ adherence to the rule of law. If citizens are 
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the ones actively participating in influencing rules and regulations, they would grant 
such laws more legitimacy and ultimately, be more prone to adhere to them. 
 
We argue that market participation is important, particularly in relation to economic 
development, the MDG and New Deal strategies do not explicitly mention market 
participation. The MDG strategy, though much of the time focusing on the 
international community and the state as actors, also highlights the importance of a 
strong civil society contributing to its surrounding society by actively participating in 
shaping the system (UN General Assembly 1 2000: 2, 7). The MDG strategy 
promotes the emergence of state systems that can benefit from the creativeness and 
energies from civil society in all arenas of life. This includes active participation in 
decision-making, policy-making and elections. As argued before, this reciprocal 
relation between state and civil society allows only for active participation to the 
extent that a state provides the possibilities for such behaviour thus highlighting the 
dire need for a strong state-civil society relation. Thereby, through the MDG 
strategy’s emphasis on active participation, civil society naturally also has an active 
responsibility and role in engaging in market activities to generate wealth and 
economic development.  
 
The New Deal strategy, in many ways, has the same approach to civil society 
according to active participation as the MDG strategy. However, the New Deal 
strategy, arguably, integrates civil society more deeply into the process of 
development. The New Deal strategy highlights, in particular under its PSG one, 
participation in political processes, participation in elections, impact on decision-
making concerning political, social and economic life and participation in dialogue 
and leadership initiatives. (g7+ 1 2011: 3) (The Dialogue 1 2013: 7) However, the 
New Deal strategy uses these standards of active participation as a measurement of 
the progress of development, as much as a goal of development, and thereby implies 
it to be a dynamic size, more than a static endpoint. Due to this proposed dynamic 
relation between state and civil society, we can extract that naturally, though never 
explicitly mentioned, civil society has a responsibility to engage in market activities 
as well as these ultimately are integrated and have consequences for political and 
social life as well. It is, however, worth mentioning that although we have extracted 
the importance of civil society engaging in market activities from the two strategies, 
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none of the two strategies give the same emphasis on market engagement as we have 
in our theoretical framework. 
4.2.2 Implementation & evaluation 
Both the MDG and New Deal strategy expresses the need to use civil society actively 
in both implementation and evaluation. Both strategies present civil society as an 
actor of implementation and improvement of strategies and policies though the extent 
and actual role of civil society vary between the strategies in different aspects.  
 
In highlighting civil society as an important development actor, the MDG strategy 
does not extensively explain the conditions and responsibilities of this role. The 
strategy does, however, relate the role of civil society to primarily monitoring and 
implementation of policies and development initiatives in cooperation with entities 
such as NGOs (UN Secretary General 2001: 43). The MDG strategy also gives 
reference to the relation between state and society by highlighting the need for 
mobilization of public opinion and the use of such as mechanisms for monitoring 
progress (UN Secretary General 2001: 25). Finally, with a strong focus on democratic 
principles and the implementation of human rights, the MDG strategy stresses the 
importance of raising civic awareness to strengthen the implementation of such 
policies (UN Secretary General 2001: 38). By mainly explaining civil society in 
context to monitoring, it could, however, be argued whether or not the role of civil 
society is justly accounted for within the MDG strategy compared to the emphasis it 
is given overall as a development actor; “[t]o give greater opportunities to the private 
sector, non-governmental organizations and civil society, in general, to contribute to 
    r  l z       f     Or    z     ’     l    d pr  r     ” (UN General Assembly 
1 2000: 9). 
 
The New Deal strategy emphasizes the use of civil society as a means to achieve 
development and improvement. In this sense, civil society not only has a 
responsibility, as mentioned earlier, of being critical of the status quo but also in 
relation to implementation and evaluation of development processes. Also, in using 
civil society as a means of measurement of the progress of the PSGs, several of the 
PSG indicators are expressed through consultation and lived experience of the 
population (The Dialogue 1 2013: 9). The New Deal strategy thus recognizes the dual 
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relationship between state and society in arguing that, “[…] an engaged public and 
civil society, which constructively monitors decision-making, is important to ensure 
accountability.” (g7+ 1 2011: 2). This places civil society as not only an important 
development actor in the processes of consultation and decision-making but also 
subsequently in implementation and evaluation of such processes. 
 
Civil society also plays an essential role in the different evaluation mechanisms of the 
two strategies: the country assessment of the MDG strategy and the fragility 
assessment of the New Deal strategy. The MDG strategy uses the common country 
assessment, which examines the national situation and the welfare of people in a 
country. It is produced between UN resident coordinators in collaboration with 
governments and civil society and is thus a tool of dialogue with national stakeholders 
to develop and improve poverty reduction strategies with point of departure in the 
subjects of the strategies. (UN Secretary General 2001: 51). This again places civil 
society mainly as a development actor in monitoring rather than decision-making and 
implementation. 
 
The fragility assessment in the New Deal strategy, using ‘the fragility spectrum’, 
develops and supports national vision and country-led policies out of fragility. It is 
based on inclusive and participatory political dialogue, which includes the active 
participation of and consultation with civil society in evaluation of the condition and 
progress of development. (g7+ 1 2011: 2). According to our theoretical body, the New 
Deal more adequately accounts for the role of civil society in decision-making, as 
accounted for in the previous sections, as well as implementation and evaluation. 
Concluding remark on the national context  
We have now analysed our main empirical data according to our theoretical 
framework of the national context. We have seen how both the MDG strategy as well 
as the New Deal strategy in many ways complies with our theory and thought of 
legitimate development. However, the strategies have also proven to be different from 
each other as well as from our theory in several aspects. Most dominantly is the MDG 
focus on state and international community collaboration, whereas New Deal much 
often emphasizes a strategy with a sole national focus in collaboration with civil 
society. Both strategies do however comply and agree on the terms related to a strong 
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state-citizen relationship, and emphasize a mutual beneficial relation between those 
two actors, though New Deal has a heavier focus on policies of social cohesion, 
which we find lacking in the MDG strategy.  
 
Both the MDG and New Deal strategies to some extent explain the role of civil 
society in accordance with our theoretical framework. Both strategies are influenced 
by an approach of perceiving civil society as interconnected with the state and 
consequently to development, however, to varying extents. In particular, the MDG 
strategy primarily relates to civil society implicitly and rarely explicitly as an 
individual actor, which does not correspond with our theoretical body, which 
proposes civil society, along with the state, as both a goal of development but equally 
important as an actor of producing legitimate development. The MDG strategy mostly 
highlights civil society, and the empowerment of such, as a goal of development 
whereas the New Deal strategy more inclusively suggests civil society as both the 
means and goal of the development strategy by including civil society more explicitly 
in both decision-making, implementation and evaluation of development.  
4.3 International community 
In this part of the analysis we will focus on the international community as an actor in 
the development in fragile states. This will be done by a closer examination of the 
international context and how the two development strategies, the MDGs and the New 
Deal, relate to the parameters under our headings of foreign aid and security that we 
have argued to most efficiently result in legitimate development in fragile states in a 
national context. 
4.3.1 Foreign aid 
In our theoretical framework we highlighted the significance of foreign aid in the 
development of fragile states, consisting of alignment of policies. We have argued 
that aid is not by definition beneficial to development processes and that the way in 
which aid is given to fragile state must be crucially taken into consideration. Through 
our theoretical framework we will now analyse the MDG and New Deal development 
strategies’ view on the role of the international community and its role in giving 
foreign aid assistance. 
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When looking at the MDG strategy, the UN promotes aid as a tool in facilitating 
development within national contexts and countries. The UN demands that donor 
countries commit to providing a minimum sum of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) equal to 0.7 per cent of their gross national product (GNP). Further, the MDG 
strategy insists that it is important to distinguishing between ODA spent on 
humanitarian assistance and on development assistance: a greater need for 
humanitarian assistance should not mean a lesser focus on development aid. (UN 
Secretary General 2001: 19, 26). This aspect of the MDG strategy coincides well with 
the aspect of our theoretical framework, which also highlights the need for aid aimed 
at development. 
 
Our theoretical frame further puts strong emphasis on the actors whom the aid is 
provided to. The MDG strategy describes the need for “[a]ssisting States in 
developing documentation programmes for their citizens, adults and children alike, 
which can provide key access to fundamental rights” (UN Secretary General 2001: 
39). This promotes the notion that aid should be given through the official 
government of a state and thereby does not highlight NGOs as the primary receivers 
and facilitators of ODA. This is further highlighted in the MDG strategy in which it is 
stated that aid ought to ensure “support for country-led economic and social 
initiatives that focus on poverty reduction” (UN Secretary General 2001: 19). We 
argue that long-term development in fragile states must come through the state in 
order to secure basic rights and structures within the country. This is due to the 
legitimacy, as perceived both by the state’s citizens and the international community, 
a state achieves through being a legitimate, efficient main development actor. The 
MDG strategy strongly emphasizes states’ role in utilizing aid in an effective manner 
that, ultimately, should make countries capable of reaching the MDGs. This does in 
fact not mean that NGOs and other available partners in the private sector are 
excluded from receiving aid or being development actors, as the strategy gives 
examples of existing and possible future cooperation with these development partners 
(UN Secretary General 2001: 22). Although giving importance to the state as a 
development actor, the MDG strategy also suggests that initiatives to secure basic 
rights, such as human rights, can be supported by the international community 
through other development partners (UN Secretary General 2001: 52-53). This 
suggests that the MDG strategy opens up for the possibility of directing aid to NGOs 
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instead of the state, for example to support NGOs in securing some basic rights that 
our theoretical framework argues should exclusively be carried out by the state.  
 
Another aspect, not properly explored by the MDG strategy, is our proposed focus on 
the delimitations of development assistance and aid. Our theoretical framework 
emphasizes the importance of aid being supplementary and not limitlessly exceeding 
the financial means of the fragile state itself, which would likely result in a 
dependency on aid. The MDG strategy focuses on increased aid and debt relief but 
not on delimitations of the amount of aid a state should receive. The lack of focus on 
the amount of aid that is healthy for a fragile state to receive can be argued to be a 
possible and potentially crucial pitfall of the strategy and could end up hurting, 
instead of helping, development of fragile states. 
 
The New Deal strategy gives clearer importance to foreign aid going through national 
actors: hereunder the state. The strategy criticise international partners for bypassing 
the state when providing aid ultimately resulting in the delivery of financial support to 
initiatives that are not harmonised with local contexts. (g7+ 1 2011: 1). This critique 
makes it clear that the New Deal strategy is highly focused on the necessity of aid 
being channelled through the state. According to our theoretical framework this is a 
valid critique arguing the state, in correspondence with civil society, to be the main 
development actor, with the clear role of the international community as being aid 
providers. The New Deal strategy goes on to emphasise the need for timely and 
predictable aid and the need for a common set of indicators to measure progress 
created through aid. Although the strategy makes it very clear that a common set of 
indicators should not be used as conditionality for receiving aid, as the role of the 
international community is not to set the development agenda but instead to support 
states’ own agendas for most effectively facilitating development. (g7+ 1 2011: 3) 
(The Dialogue 1 2013: 5). This alludes to the notion that the financial situation of a 
country should be coordinated with the amount of aid given to that country.  
 
The question of alignment of policies and agendas is important when looking at 
foreign aid provided to fragile states, as shown in our theoretical framework. 
Throughout the MDG strategy there is an apparent desire, in addition to creating 
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national development, in strengthening the UN and this is to be done by states 
ratifying and adopting UN policies on a national level: 
 
“E c  r      G v r          f lf l     r       r       bl       ,    ratify the 
  x pr  c p l       r       r        r    ly.” (Un Secretary General 2001: 37) 
[and] “Encouraging Governments to nurture democratic values, ideals and 
institutions and to develop independent judiciaries and media” (UN Secretary 
General 2001: 44). 
 
This proposes the need for alignment between national and international levels of 
development policies. Alignment of policies and strategies are not per definition a 
hindrance to development, however, it does suggest that state ultimately could lose 
sovereignty to the international community, as the latter is a dominant actor in 
articulating and implementing development. According to our theoretical frame, this 
strong focus on the international community’s role as being a main development actor 
rather than supplementary to national processes of development is flawed. This 
proposed fortified role of the international community does not adequately include a 
broad consideration a highly differentiated world comprised of states on many 
different socio-cultural, economic and political levels and structures. Our theoretical 
framework does, however, argue that policy and development alignment is important. 
If the international community is to be as efficient as possible in supplementing 
national processes of development, some kind of consensus needs to exist on how to 
best facilitate development. What is important to keep in mind, in this context, is that 
the main actor and setting of development must happen nationally through the state, 
which ought to be well enmeshed into civil society. From this perspective, the MDG 
places too much importance and possible sovereignty onto the international, instead 
of the national, community. 
 
The New Deal strategy has little direct focus on alignment between the national and 
international level. The main focus in the New Deal strategy is on the national context 
of producing goals, implementation, and development. This focus on the local and 
national context of development is to a degree in agreement with our theoretical 
frame. However, even though it could be argued that expecting aid assistance, and 
eventually being granted aid, would be the result of some alignment of goals between 
donor and receiving countries. However, in this perspective very little focus is put on 
implementation and evaluation of those goals. This is due to the New Deal strategy’s 
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strong promotion of state-ownership and –leadership. State ownership may result in 
more national sovereignty but could also result in the exclusion of knowledge from 
the international community (g7+ 1 2011: 2-3); both from the global North and South. 
This lack of focus on alignment between national and international levels could lead 
to increased national sovereignty but also to missed opportunities of development. 
The role of the international community, in this sense, corresponds with our theory to 
the extent that national ownership could ideally lead to the articulation of localised 
development needs without the interference of the international community, however 
falters as it preconceives that states can work independently from the international 
community. 
4.3.2 Security 
According to our theoretical framework on international context it is of importance 
that the international community supports and promotes security within states to 
facilitate legitimate development. In order for ensuring security there are sub-factors 
that need to be fulfilled; those of legitimacy and accountability. 
 
A high degree of legitimacy allows the international community to perceive the state 
as being a reliable and cooperative actor within international development politics. It 
also makes the state able to prevent internal conflicts through national cooperation 
and negotiation within the state’s institutions. Accountability takes a step outside the 
national borders, thus expanding the geopolitical area to neighbouring countries or 
states with similar political and economic obstacles, such as in the example of the 
union of the g7+. The MDG and the New Deal strategies both emphasize the role of 
the international community to promote legitimacy and accountability within fragile 
states. However, their points of focus and ways to approach this endorsement vary to 
different degrees.  
 
In the New Deal strategy’s section on FOCUS, which highlight terms of commitments 
for development results, the statement: “we will jointly identify oversight and 
accountability measures required to enhance confidence in and to enable the 
expanded use and strengthening of country systems"  (g7+ 1 2011: 3), the New Deal 
strategy thus emphasizes, by the use of ‘confidence’, the country’s ability to live up to 
terms that allow the state to achieve better acknowledgement as a solid co-operator 
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within the international community, and thus attain more effective outcomes of ODA, 
as discussed in the section on foreign aid. In addition, the common indicators 
mentioned in the New Deal strategy stresses that an agreement to a set of common 
indicators to measure and plan further progress: 
 
“also helps to focus international assistance and to advance a common agenda 
for strengthening national statistical systems necessary to actually use and 
measure progress and achievements against agreed indicators and for 
knowledge sharing” (The Dialogue 1 2013: 5) 
 
This account shows that a certain degree of alignment of development policies, that 
needs support from the international community, can be beneficial by focusing 
resources towards a particular development agenda. One could argue that this 
statement promotes accountability as it advocates for a common, streamlined set of 
measuring indicators that centres, or regionalizes politically, g7+ countries around a 
specific set of development goals. Another example of the awareness of 
accountability: “we will facilitate the exchange of South-South and Fragile-Fragile 
experiences on transitions out of fragility” (g7+ 1 2011: 3) which again indicates that 
the international community, mentioning the ‘we’, on the side-line can support the 
outcomes of these mutual, regional experiences discovered among the fragile states. 
Also, in the New Deal strategy it is a general point that the enabling of national and 
international actors to all partake in measuring progress and communicate results 
toward PSG implementation to citizens and other constituencies (The Dialogue 1 
2013: 4). The international community thus seems to be collaborating with the 
individual fragile state on equal terms which, according to the theoretical framework, 
promotes both legitimacy and accountability. Legitimacy due to increased 
acknowledgement with the international community by achieving satisfying results 
based on measurements and actions of implementation developed in the communion 
of the needing states and the international community. Accountability because 
agreements on common indicators foster an agenda that the individual fragile state 
would prefer to be a part of in order to receive increased funds and resources for 
improvement by the international community.  
 
The MDG strategy likewise puts an effort in emphasizing the importance of the role 
of the international community in terms of supporting fragile states. However, it can 
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be argued that it is not representing the same degree of inclusiveness regarding the 
international community’s role in advocating for legitimacy and accountability. When 
mentioning the common responsibility among all nations of the world for managing 
worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace 
and security, it is clearly stated that: “[as] the most universal and most representative 
organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role” (UN 
General Assembly 1 2001:2). This statement disagrees with our theoretical framework 
in that it places the international community, among others the UN, at the top priority, 
or in a ‘the central role’, in taking responsibility for managing universal, worldwide 
economic and social development. The theoretical framework advocates for 
legitimate development that allows the international community to support national 
development initiatives but not necessarily to ‘play the central role’. However, and to 
avoid jumping to conclusions, the UN, while addressing the role of globalization in 
supporting the special needs of developing countries, it accentuates:  
 
“[…] only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, 
based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be 
made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and 
measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing 
countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented 
with their effective participation.” (UN General Assembly 1 2001: 2) 
 
This statement corresponds with the theoretical framework to the degree that it 
shows the international community’s awareness of the need for supportive efforts 
including ‘policies and measures’ that corresponds to individual states in 
developmental and economic transition. By mentioning that these actions should take 
place ‘at the global level’ one could argue that what is meant here, is that a strong 
collaboration between the UN as well as other development actors within the 
international community should be actively corresponding to the assessments 
articulated by the fragile states. In addition to the MDG strategy’s emphasis on 
‘global level’ development it can be relevant to include its view on international law 
systems: “[c]onflicts between States can be resolved through the use of the 
international legal framework and the International Court of Justice” (UN Secretary 
General 1 2001: 13). This point illustrates the involvement of the international 
community as being the referee, or mediator, between states that cannot overcome 
conflict situations by themselves. Drawn from these statements, the role of the 
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international community within the MDG strategy can be considered legitimate in 
relation to ensuring security in fragile states due to the aim of a  ‘broad and 
sustained’ approach to development that seeks to safeguard a secure, long-term 
integration of the state into society. Also, by stating that the MDG strategy wants to 
“[…] encourage and sustain regional and subregional mechanisms for preventing 
conflict and promoting political stability, and to ensure a reliable flow of resources 
for peacekeeping operations on the continent” (UN General Assembly 1 2001: 8) it 
shows a concern for the fulfilment of accountability. The MDG strategy, based on 
these examples, thus corresponds fairly with the theoretical framework although it is 
putting greater emphasis on the international community having the central role. 
Whereas the New Deal strategy weighs the equal relationship between the individual 
state and the international community higher, it also corresponds better to our 
theoretical framework. 
Concluding remark on the international context 
To sum up, by examining the role of the international community, we can see various 
tendencies in the two strategies’ approaches to legitimate development in fragile 
states.  
 
Regarding the planning and distribution of foreign aid, we see a tendency that the 
MDG strategy puts a greater emphasis on the role of the international community, 
greater than what is stressed in our theoretical framework. We found that the MDG 
strategy lacks delimitations in the distribution of aid, which can lead to bypassing the 
state in development processes due to unsatisfying progress of the aims of the 
provided aid, thus undermining sovereignty and legitimacy in the given fragile state. 
In addition, the general policy and strategy alignment that the MDG strategy stresses 
is not necessarily a hindrance to development, however, it suggests that the state 
could lose sovereignty to the international community, because the latter is perceived 
as the most dominant development actor. It can thus be argued that the MDG strategy 
does not take diversity between countries into proper consideration in the question of 
the most legitimate way of providing aid. Our theoretical standpoint suggests that it is 
important to establish some kind of consensus in facilitating development, as it must 
happen through the state that is fairly enmeshed into civil society of the given state, as 
argued in the section of the national context. 
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 However, in contrast, the New Deal strategy can likewise be criticized for putting 
greater emphasis on the state as being the main development actor. Where this 
strategy strongly accounts for a timely and predictable set of common indicators to 
measure the progress created by aid, which should solely be channelled through the 
state, it can be criticized that there is little focus on the possible gains from a certain 
degree of policy and development strategy alignment fostered by a strong interplay 
between the individual state and the international community. 
 
When examining the degree to which the two strategies take into consideration the 
factors security, legitimacy and accountability we likewise see different results. The 
New Deal acknowledge that the fragile states need a way of pursuing ‘confidence’ in 
their state, in order to be able to reach a level of legitimacy that can satisfy all parties 
in the interplay between state, civil society, and the international community. By 
using the Common Indicators to measure and plan further development progress also 
helps to focus international assistance and to reach a common agenda, on equal terms, 
for strengthening national statistical systems necessary to measure progress 
achievements, thus aiming for the agreed indicators and furthering knowledge 
sharing. 
  
The MDG strategy also stresses the importance of the role of the international 
community in furthering security, legitimacy and accountability in fragile states; 
however they, according to our theoretical stance, lack a certain degree of 
inclusiveness. There is a tendency from the this strategy to encourage a ‘global level’ 
of development, thus emphasizing the international community as being the main 
actor, or as argued, functioning as a referee or mediator in this respect.  
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5. Discussion 
In the following chapter, we will use results from our analysis to facilitate a 
discussion on the compatibility of the two strategies and thus answer our working 
question three: How are the two strategies compatible according to the parameters: 
goals, the process of reaching the goals and the actors responsible for achieving the 
goals? So far our theoretical proposition has been that legitimate, long-termed 
development happens when the state is perceived as a legitimate, efficient, and 
capable main development actor by civil society as well as the international 
community. Taking into account our analysis on how the MDG and New Deal 
strategy are in different levels of alignment with our theoretical body, we shall now 
consider the MDG and New Deal strategies in extension of each other: how The 
Dialogue originally intended the order of the strategies. In order to discuss the 
compatibility of the two strategies, we have chosen to concentrate on three criteria of 
compatibility: the compatibility of goals, the process of reaching the goals and the 
actors responsible for achieving the goals. The main focus of the discussion will be 
on how similarities or differences between the strategies either potentially benefit or 
hinder the accumulated process of the strategies as a combined effort. Ultimately, a 
discussion will be initiated on the strategies’ dynamic relation to the international 
debate on future development. 
5.1 Goals 
In assessing the compatibility between the MDG and New Deal strategy, we need to 
discuss to what extent the two strategies differ in their articulation of development 
goals. The main imperative of the New Deal strategy’s development goals is state- 
and peacebuilding to come about by establishing sovereignty through national 
development processes. If the state is efficient in managing public matters on behalf 
of and in collaboration with civil society, the state is likely to be seen as legitimately 
sovereign by its citizens. In case of the MDG strategy, the focus is on global poverty 
reduction and development through international cooperation, which we see as 
leading to the individual countries surrendering some of their sovereignty. Even 
though the state may be sovereign in deciding to ratify or adopt international 
strategies or policies, the conditions of such commitments would still be produced 
through a supranational forum, which no state has absolute sovereignty over. 
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We have hitherto argued that according to our theoretical frame, the New Deal 
strategy is most complimentary in creating development out of fragility by building 
up state-civil society relations and by focusing on national development and thus 
national accountability and legitimacy. The transition out of fragility as a main goal of 
the strategy is explicitly articulated in arguing that current ways of engaging in fragile 
states need revision and improvement and that, “medium- to long-term sustainable 
results [will only be] brought about by building capacity and systems” (g7+ 1 2011: 
1). Where this focus is prevalent in the New Deal strategy, the MDG strategy 
arguably focuses on poverty reduction through the joint effort of the incorporation of 
national states into the international community; by emphasizing things such as 
shared international responsibility, market accesses, and global stability and thus 
international accountability and legitimacy. This is evident in the strategy proclaiming 
that, “in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have 
a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and 
equity at the global level” (UN General Assembly 1 2000: 1). 
 
This differentiated view on development goals, prevalent in the MDG and New Deal 
strategies, does not pose a direct threat to the strategies’ compatibility from a goal-
oriented point of view. As the New Deal strategy focuses on transition out of fragility 
and then the subsequent adoption of the MDG strategy into further internationally 
related development, the accumulated process can be seen as roughly two overall 
goals: development out of fragility and development into becoming an actor in the 
international community. These two overall goals are not in direct conflict since, 
according to the New Deal’s idea of the strategies going in extension of each other, 
the goals are not supposed to happen simultaneously but rather in extension. 
5.2 The process of reaching the goals 
We have through the analysis repeatedly encountered how the two strategies have 
different approaches to the process of reaching the goals. The New Deal strategy’s 
approach to the process of reaching the goals can be seen as first focusing on creating 
sustainable results of statebuilding and peacebuilding: a well-functioning state. An 
efficient state is then to be the foundation for taking part in the MDG strategy and 
thereby effectively reaching the MDGs. However, we argue that the New Deal 
strategy can also be seen as only producing short- or medium-termed development on 
54 
 
its own as the strategy’s goal is to eventually take part in the MDG strategy. An 
example of why a country with an inefficient state would likely not experience 
sustainable development is the argument that poorly functioning state systems are a 
hindrance not only to the state itself but also to other development aspects within a 
country. We argue that a country with no efficiently functioning market has less than 
optimistic prospects of formal economic growth. Even if informal income generating 
activities exist, as a result of informal or illegal economic systems, the accumulated 
wealth of such activities would likely not be spent on improving livelihoods for the 
broader population and thereby only benefit and develop a limited group within a 
country. In combating poverty and inequality, the lack of a state managing a market 
and accumulating wealth, would likely result in highly unequal distribution of wealth 
both in terms of economic progress as well as improving the livelihood of an entire 
population thus creating detrimental spill over effects into, e.g., some of the just 
mentioned aspects of development. 
 
The MDG strategy can be argued as producing long-term development, however, only 
if the structures and institutions of a society are capable of handling the process of 
properly implementing the strategy. Short-term development would likely be an 
outcome if states are incapable of achieving the MDGs due to lack of functioning 
state systems. In this sense we see the process of reaching the collective goals of the 
two strategies as being compatible if the point of departure is rooted in the notion that 
a well-functioning state is essential in order to become part of an international context 
such as the UN. 
  
However, there arguably is a significant difference between the MDGs and the New 
Deal strategy in their approaches to when the target areas of the strategies are to be set 
in action. The MDG strategy is arguably more goal-oriented than the New Deal 
strategy, focusing heavily on the outcome of development rather than the process. In 
this sense, the focus on reaching the eight MDGs as the ultimate outcome of the 
strategy offers limited guidance to how and when to go about development practices 
and policies in each country. (Sumner and Tiwari 2009: 44-45) The targets for each 
goal, though, do provide some guidance to the process, however, from a one-fits-all 
perspective. In this sense, the MDG strategy is less applicable to fragile states where 
state institutions are not developed into being capable of undertaking development 
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tasks. It is further likely that such states would also be incapable of appropriately 
assessing what aspects of the MDG strategy are most important to implement into 
their exact national context and its needs. The strategy would thus be more easily 
applied to countries capable of assessing the most urgent needs of the country and 
further take action into developing those key areas of development.  
 
The New Deal provides a more process-oriented framework than the MDG strategy. 
Using the fragility spectrum, the strategy presents degrees of fragility ranging from 
levels from one to ten and within each degree a set of priorities and guiding tasks for 
government action and donor action (The Dialogue 3 2011: 6). The compatibility of 
the two approaches comply more with the idea of the New Deal strategy preceding 
the MDG strategy: level ten of the fragility spectrum explicitly describes having 
established functioning state systems. These systems are, according to the strategy, 
prerequisite for achieving the MDGs. In this sense, it is theoretically possible to 
change from a process-oriented strategy, of the New Deal, to a more goal-oriented 
strategy, of the MDG strategy. However, it should also be kept in mind that the two 
strategies differ in more than one aspect of the process of achieving development 
goals. The MDGs are time-bound and have, in addition to goals to be reached along 
the way, a specific timeframe ending in 2015. The New Deal, on the other hand, 
focuses holistically on allowing fragile states to develop according to the timeframe 
most appropriate for their national context. The difference in timeframes also presents 
a potential challenge for the compatibility of the two strategies since fragile states 
may take more than 15 years, the timeframe of the MDGs, to advance past their 
fragility status. 
5.3 The actors responsible for achieving the goals 
When looking at which role the development actors has in the two strategies, we have 
found that the MDG strategy focuses on a strong international community in 
collaboration with states whereas the New Deal focuses on strong states, as actors of 
development, with support from the international community.  By the MDG strategy 
emphasizing the state as a development actor, as well as the international 
community’s responsibilities to support such national actors, it presupposes the 
existence of already established and somewhat efficient state structures. This does not 
coincide with the fundamental thought behind the New Deal strategy, as it emphasizes 
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the need for statebuilding through state-owned processes and thereby recognizes the 
absence of efficient state structures, which the MDG strategy takes for granted. On 
the other hand, however, the difference in view of development actors could also be 
seen as a strength when the two strategies are put in extension of each other. This 
would arguably be the case if the New Deal strategy builds up an efficient state that 
could consequently become a legitimate actor in the MDG strategy. In this sense, the 
state would first be both an actor and a goal of development and later, through the 
MDG strategy, mainly a development actor. 
 
The MDG and New Deal strategies, however, are not uncompromisingly compatible. 
Even if the goals of the strategies are put in extension of each other, the shift from the 
New Deal strategy into the MDG strategy would mean a change of focus on 
development actors. In leaving behind the state-civil society focus in the New Deal 
strategy and adopting the MDG strategy’s focus on national-international cooperation, 
civil society loses explicitly articulated emphasis as a development actor. This 
suggests that the transition between the strategies is unaddressed in the New Deal 
strategy and could therefore create confusion about which development actors should 
hold what responsibilities during this phase.  
 
We have now argued for different ways of approaching the two strategies as 
compatible while acknowledging that every possibility contains its own advantages 
and challenges. However, in addition to compatibility of the content of the MDG and 
New Deal strategies, it is further relevant to discuss the combination of the strategies’ 
compatibility with the international debate which they are a part of. 
5.4 The international debate on development 
Having discussed how the MDG and New Deal development strategies are somewhat 
compatible in extension of each other, we will now discuss the strategies in context to 
the debate they are part of. The reason for discussing this is that when arguing that the 
strategies are theoretically compatible, we have so far left out considerations 
preceding such decision to allow the strategies to be put in extension. If the strategies 
were to go in extension of each other, they would also have to be agreed upon 
internationally as it would be the UN that would ultimately decide whether or not to 
adopt and commit to the New Deal strategy in addition to the MDG strategy. While 
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still keeping with our focus on the theoretical aspects of the compatibility of the 
strategies, this brings focus to the question of access into international development 
debates by different development actors: representing the global North and South. 
5.4.1 Global South as participants in the international debate  
In order for the New Deal strategy to be adopted into the UN development agenda, it 
would have to be adopted and ratified by the member states of the UN and even 
before that be allowed into the development debate. Due to the MDG strategy having 
failed to produce globally satisfactory results, compared to the goals set up at the turn 
of the millennium, revisions of the MDG strategy and debates on development have 
emerged taking into account different aspects contributing to that failure. The g7+, as 
part of a much larger group of critics of the MDG strategy, is a self-articulating group 
of countries highlighting how,  
 
“[a]lthough the members speak different languages, the g7+ talks with one 
voice. For the first time in history, conflict-affected states can translate that 
voice into action on the ground by taking a hand formally in shaping global 
policy, participating in major international dialogues and negotiations and 
representing the 1.3 billion people who live in conflict-affected situations.” (Da 
Costa 2012: 98). 
 
This highlights how groupings of the global South, if nothing less, perceive 
themselves as being new participants in the international debate on development. 
However, being participants in the international development debate does not 
automatically equate influence. 
 
In spite of the g7+ communicating their proposed needs through the New Deal, to 
which the UN has eventually become an international partner, the New Deal strategy 
is yet to be directly adopted into a UN development strategy in a post-2015 
framework. In this sense access into international debates does not necessarily or 
automatically grant influence. Even if the global South is able to enter into dialogue, 
the international community still does not only represent their development agenda 
but rather the international community’s agenda as a whole. Therefore, the self-
articulated needs of the global South, and the g7+, may enter into the international 
debate on development but if the overall international community’s main priorities lie 
elsewhere, the global South’s needs are likely to be under-prioritized. (Netherlands 
Development Assistance Research Council 2006: 8). 
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5.4.2 Alignment of goals in the international development debate 
It is important to remember that the compatibility between the MDG and New Deal 
strategies not only relates to the content of the strategies but also to the prioritization 
of development goals within such strategies. In the same way as international 
cooperation is dependent on an alignment of strategies, it is also influenced by 
alignment of prioritizing the goals and incentives of those strategies. The needs of the 
global South must thus be a main priority for the international community as a whole 
in order to be prioritized as such. However, the matter of alignment of priorities is not 
exclusively influenced by the neither the global North nor South. In addition to each 
member state of the UN expressing their own agendas and desires, the overall 
international agenda is likewise influenced by arbitrary global events that provoke 
changes in international priorities: such as, “9/11 […], financial crisis of 2008, and 
from the Arab Spring to climate change” (ActionAid 2012: 2). Thus the imperative of 
this part of the discussion is to understand that compatibility of the MDG and New 
Deal strategies can be understood from both the perspective of putting the strategies 
in extension of each other but also as an issue of creating alignment between the 
prioritizations of strategies reflecting the needs of the global South and of strategies 
reflecting the overall international community. 
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6. Conclusion 
With a point of departure in the problem formulation:    w     x      r      ‘N w 
D  l f r E             Fr   l  S     ’   d     ‘M ll       D v l p     G  l ’ 
development strategies compatible in approaching the challenges of development in 
fragile states? Our aim has been to investigate the compatibility of the two strategies 
in relation to a theoretical framework built on an idea of legitimate development in 
fragile states.  
 
We can conclude on each strategy’s weak and strong points in relation to the theory 
and thereby development in fragile states. We can conclude that both the MDG 
strategy as well as the New Deal strategy in many ways act in accordance with the 
thought of legitimate development in fragile states, though some aspects of difference 
are of importance to our further conclusion. The main point of difference, which has 
had its impact throughout the rest of the project, is the differentiated focus of the 
MDG strategy emphasizing international community in collaboration with states. 
Whereas the New Deal strategy highlights a point of departure in a national focus in 
collaboration with civil society and support from international partners. Further is it 
worth noticing that although both strategies have a heavy focus on a strong state-
society relation, both strategies as well lack, in relation to our theoretical framework, 
a sufficient perspective of civil society as an individual actor of development in 
fragile states.  
 
The international community’s role as a development actor is highly contested. We 
can conclude that the MDG strategy, according to our theoretical framework, has a 
too strong emphasis on the central position of the international community, which 
thereby undermines individual states’ sovereignty. The New Deal strategy, however, 
ends up having too little trust in the gains possible from collaboration with 
international community. We thus see the MDG strategy as undermining a legitimate 
development approach by focusing primarily at the global level, thereby lacks the 
inclusiveness that our theory proposes, while the New Deal strategy ends up with an 
emphasis on a too narrow development focus. 
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From the findings in our analysis, we have been able to discuss and thus conclude on 
our problem formulation relating to the compatibility of the strategies. With the 
intended constellation of the New Deal strategy leading up to the MDG strategy, we 
have discussed the compatibility by focusing on three parameters in relation to the 
strategies dominant in the analysis.   
 
The goals of the two strategies are not in conflict when looking at the compatibility in 
spite of being different. The strategies are not in conflict as their goals of bringing 
countries out of state fragility and poverty reduction through increased international 
collaboration, are not supposed to happen simultaneously. However, the processes 
towards those goals vary considerably, as they are focused on reaching different 
goals. We have thus argued that implications between the strategies’ perceptions of 
timeframes and prioritization of actions do have an impact on the compatibility. 
Although the differences between being a goal- and process oriented strategy could 
arguably comply well in compatibility, as the New Deal strategy should precede the 
MDG strategy.  
 
The strategies’ different foci on, respectively, national and international actors cohere 
to an overall idea of a sustainable, long-term development process where each aspect 
of the legitimate development process will be met. However, this suggestion still has 
implications due to the unexplained process of achieving sovereignty and later 
surrendering parts of that sovereignty to the international community.  
 
We thus conclude that essential conditions such as focus and prioritization of goals, 
the process towards reaching those goals and the actors responsible for achieving the 
goals each contribute to both challenges and advantages in promoting development in 
fragile states. However, we can lastly conclude that in relation to the extent that the 
strategies are compatible, it is necessary to take into account considerations preceding 
such decision that actually allow the strategies to be put in extension. This means that 
the need for a ‘New Deal’ has to be recognized in the international debate on the 
future of development strategies, before it can be incorporated as a global focus. 
 
Our final conclusion of the problem formulation is that there are some essential 
aspects in the strategies, which challenge the compatibility in the three parameters. 
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We do, however, recognize that the intended constellation, the MDG strategy in 
extension of the New Deal strategy, in many ways does fit our theoretical framework 
of legitimate development. 
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Afterthoughts 
Our theoretical frame has shaped our perception of the world in this project and our 
conclusions are thus influenced by an exclusively theoretical point of view. Thus our 
conclusions do not reflect current debates on the 2015 development agenda nor on the 
ground experiences, which as well have an effect on the future of fragile states. We 
will therefore in this segment include such aspects of alternative ways of approaching 
development of fragile states in this chapter by addressing the following points of 
interest: g7+ and the fragility club, from theory to the real world, and post 2015 – 
development strategies of the future.  
g7+ and the fragility club 
Due to this project’s aim of theoretically examining the New Deal strategy, 
represented by the g7+ formation, in a comparative analysis with the MDG strategy, 
we want to reflect on the New Deal strategy’s position in the global development 
debate. In the project, we have worked through statically perceiving the g7+ as having 
a genuine desire to develop fragile states rather than possessing ulterior motives of 
exploitation based in corruption. By this account, it could be interesting to critically 
consider the incentives behind the g7+ as well as look at the strategy’s position in the 
international debate as the g7+ represents itself as a new accumulated strong voice for 
the global South. This is in spite of the g7+ being a relatively newly formed 
communion, consisting of possibly weak voice individually, whose long-term 
presence in the international debate is yet to be determined.  
 
The g7+ is from our perspective an interesting formation, since states declare 
themselves as being fragile and/or conflict affected. The group could seem to be a 
club no one wants to be a part of (Wyeth 2012: 9) given that the labels of fragility and 
conflict are obviously not flattering attributes. Despite these undesirable labels, the 
g7+ has member states across the global South and is now being represented as a 
common voice, articulating the self-described current needs of fragile states. Some 
will argue that the g7+ can and will be of significant influence in the current and 
future development debates on fragile states and that the possible sharing of 
experiences and mutual development problems among the g7+ member states can be 
seen as a new strength for the global South (Da Costa 2012: 98). Another option 
might be that states primarily enter the g7+ to set the terms for a more consistent and 
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intensified flow of foreign aid with less control and monitoring from donor countries. 
This could possibly result in evident exploitation of potential loopholes in the New 
Deal framework. We find this to be an interesting focus of investigation and the g7+ 
could therefore be a subject for further exploration.  
From policy to implementation 
Due to having deliberately delimited ourselves from the aspect of implementation in 
the project, it would further be interesting to reflect on the issue of implementation, or 
lack of, in the MDG and New Deal strategies. 
 
Both strategies contain elements of time-restricted frameworks for initiating and 
achieving development goals. However, there are no articulated repercussions to the 
failure of achieving the goals within those timeframes. This is a problem as 
responsibilities and the capacity to live up to those responsibilities are incentive for 
legitimate development: without consequences for accountability, the prospects of 
building up well-functioning states and civil societies could be stalled. 
 
The process of implementing the New Deal strategy’s peacebuilding and statebuilding 
goals is going on at this very moment through selected pilot countries with an 
estimated completion in 2015 where the results will be summed up. (g7+ 2 2012: 2)  
At this point, we thus cannot yet determine if the results of these attempts of 
implementation of the New Deal strategy might be any different from that of the 
MDG strategy. It could, however, be interesting to follow this implementation process 
more comprehensively and explore the prospective challenges when following a 
development strategy from policy to implementation. 
Post 2015 - development strategies of the future 
The post 2015 debates are on-going as a product of the knowledge gained through the 
process of implementing the MDG strategy. The future of development strategies 
created by the UN arguably stands at a crossroads where several possible ways to 
move forward are present.  
 
Firstly, there is the possibility of extending the timeframe for the MDG strategy so 
that the countries with lacking progress have more time to meet the eight goals. 
Secondly, it is also an option to completely discard the thought of a timeframe and 
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acknowledge that it is not possible for the whole world to reach the MDGs within the 
same period of time. Thirdly, there is the possibility of creating new targets from new 
theories of development and new knowledge obtained through the process of trying to 
reach the MDGs. (Sumner & Tiwari 2009: 68-69) 
 
Given that our empirical data of both the MDG and the New Deal strategy either have 
or lobby for influence through the UN, it could be interesting to investigate whether 
or not an initiative such as the New Deal could function outside the UN development 
forum. Though the New Deal is articulated by an international group, the g7+, 
representing the global South, the policy is still being lobbied to become part of the 
UN post-2015 development agenda. Therefore it would be interesting to consider to 
what degree development could actually happen outside the UN development frame 
and still produce results. 
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